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This thesis explores the ongoing Malay-Muslim separatist insurgency in southern 
Thailand.  In particular, it argues that historically-rooted structural factors, to include 
relative economic deprivation, limited political integration, and struggle for the 
maintenance of ethnic-religious identity, are at the root of this insurgency.  The year 2001 
produced two catalysts for the renewal of this insurgency, one internal and one external.  
The internal catalyst was a newly elected suppressive government regime under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party.  The external catalyst 
was the growing, increasingly radicalized Islamist movement, largely defined through 
terrorist violence, that expressed itself in the 9/11 attacks.  The combination of these has 
produced rekindled secessionist violence of a previously unknown level in the Thai 
provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala. 
Given the deeply ingrained structural cause of this insurgency, as well as a 
government administration whose policies and conflict mismanagement continually fuels 
the violence, the prospect for conflict resolution is not promising.  Nonetheless, it 
remains in the best interests of the United States that this conflict is soon resolved.  
Should the insurgency continue growing, the situation may reach a point of drastic 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“What experience and history teach is this- that people and governments never 
have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.”  This 
commentary offered by Georg Hegel in the introduction of his Philosophy of History 
offers a sobering albeit realistic assessment of governments’ failure to learn from the 
past.   History is a continuum of lessons not learned.  That is why history repeats itself. 
Thailand’s current government under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is 
demonstrating that it too has failed to learn the lessons of history.  As a result, violence in 
southernmost Thailand, the former kingdom of Patanni,1 has once again escalated.   
This thesis examines the nature and causes of the rekindled violence in Thailand’s 
southernmost three provinces2.  The renewed violence actually began in 2001 but reached 
a previously unknown level in 2004.  Indications of events thus far in the first three 
months of 2005 suggest that this southern unrest has escalated even beyond its 2004 
level.3  If real causes are not soon recognized and admitted to, and genuine solutions not 
soon applied, the further escalation of violence in southern Thailand could lead to several 
conclusions, none of which are desirable for either Thailand or the United States.   
The worst of these conclusions is that the continued violence will further attract 
international jihadist elements and southern Thailand will very much become an integral 
part of the next front of transnational terrorism.  This would escalate the intensity of 
violence manifold, almost certainly requiring external intervention to fight it.  Another 
possibility is that continued violence will lead the Thai government to further enflame the 
situation through increased use of force to quell this violence.  Such an increased use of 
force, if Thailand’s track record says anything, will almost certainly entail avoidance of 
proper rule of law and a substantial abuse of human rights.  So much damage has already 
been done to Malay-Muslim relations with the Thai state, and so much trust between all  
1 Pattani is the name of the formally independent Muslim kingdom or sultanate, which had been 
located in modern day southernmost Thailand, as well as a current province in southern Thailand.  The 
English rendition of the Thai spelling is Pattani, while the English rendition of the Malay spelling is 
Patani.  For the simple sake of uniformity, I use Pattani throughout this thesis, with appropriate meaning 
understood from context. 
2 Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. 
3 For the most recent assessment of the situation, see Anthony Davis, “No end in sight for southern 
Thailand’s escalating insurgency,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (March 01, 2005): posted 17 Feb 2005. 
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involved parties already lost, that it will take years of damage repair as the situation 
currently stands.  Further inflammation of this damage may very well lead to a point of 
no return in which Malay-Muslim relations with the Thai state are simply beyond repair.  
A final possible conclusion, though least probable, is that continued violence could lead 
to a civil war in Thailand’s South between Buddhists and Muslims.  Such an affair could 
easily spill over not only into the rest of Thailand, but also into neighboring countries, 
most notably Malaysia. 
It is important to the United States that the Thai government controls this situation 
before its escalation leads to one of the above scenarios.  Militarily, Thailand remains a 
key player for the United States.  A reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea and the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan may mean that Thailand would become all the 
more important as a possible regional basing location.  With its location and basing 
potential, it could serve as the United States’ southern door into China in the event of a 
future United States-China conflict.4  Politically, it is in the United States’ best interests, 
and consistent with U.S. foreign policy, for Thailand to successfully develop into a 
strong, stable democracy.  The current circumstances in the South directly threaten such 
successful development.  In a geographic region that still includes military regimes and 
communist rulers, Thailand’s democracy is of even greater significance.  Finally, the 
global war on terrorism is currently center-stage in the world arena.  This is a war that 
transcends national borders and redefines current understanding of sovereignty.   Current 
U. S. foreign policy calls for the necessity of taking this war to the enemy in order to 
keep peace at home.  This is immensely draining on resources, however, as the United 
States simply cannot unilaterally do battle everywhere at once.  As such, it is essential 
that Thailand successfully resolve its current southern crisis once and for all.  
The recently rekindled conflict in southernmost Thailand received a spark in 
2001, the year that saw both the 9/11 horror on the world stage and the election of 
Thaksin as Thai premier.  The escalation onto its current high level began on 4 January 
2004 when an estimated more than one hundred insurgents raided an army camp in 
Narathiwat province and stole over 300 weapons.  The situation worsened on the heels of 
 
4 For further assessment on the importance of Thailand in future U.S. force posturing, see the March 
2005 Naval Postgraduate School thesis written by my colleague, Capt. Bayani C. Dilag, USAF: Access 
Issues Associated with U.S. Military Presence in Thailand and the Philippines.  
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two heavy-handed reactions by Thai security forces that resulted in unnecessary deaths: 
the 28 April Krue Se incident and the 25 October Tak Bai incident.  Media sources report 
upwards of six hundred insurgency-related deaths in southern Thailand throughout 2004.5  
This thesis analyzes the nature of this tremendous violence and its various root 
causes.  As for methodology, it first looks at the historical roots of the insurgency to be 
found in the history of Malay-Muslim relations with the Thai state, including the 
manifestation of these roots in current demographics.  It then examines the heart of the 
insurgency movement in the second half of last century, ending with an in-depth focus on 
the current state of the insurgency since 2001.  As such, this thesis then determines the 
causative factors of this insurgency.   
The theoretical model for this analysis is founded upon what academia has 
concluded about the nature of insurgencies based on the theory of revolutionary 
movements.  The underlying premise is that insurgencies emerge from structural 
maladjustments within a given social system, to include economic and political 
subsystems.  Thus, structural factors that contribute to social, economic and political 
deprivation are key to understanding the growth of insurgencies.  Insurgencies are 
generally the response of people who are not getting enough of something.  This is not 
simply income, though income is certainly a structural variable, but can include status, 
educational opportunity, social and political participation, and recognition of unique 
identity.  
The precision of government violence is another variable in insurgencies.  The 
reflective response of governments to insurgency is usually suppression, often added onto 
existing structural suppression.  Studies of past insurgencies in Thailand and Vietnam 
suggest that governmental application of suppressive security measures in the absence of 
structural change increases the size of an insurgency.  The less focused the government 
violence, the greater the increase in insurgent violence.  
Finally, external support is another important variable in insurgencies.  Frustrated 
people, especially if historically unable to overcome structural maladjustments by 
themselves, will often turn to outsiders for help.  The help insurgents seek will range 
 
5 Exact numbers are difficult to ascertain.  Different sources report different totals, and not all 
insurgency related deaths were reported to or by the media.  What is certain is there was an average of more 
than one insurgency-related death in southern Thailand per day in 2004. 
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from monetary to arms support.  This external support often contributed to the further 
increase in insurgency violence.           
The thesis first examines the relationship between the Malay-Muslim community 
in southern Thailand and the Thai state within a historical context beginning with the 
Ayuttthaya period.  This examination draws several conclusions.  Among these is that the 
conflict in southern Thailand has not historically been primarily about religion.  It is an 
ethnic conflict with politics at its heart, a conflict that does involve some genuine 
religious differences but sees discontents using religion mainly as a tool towards political 
ends.  Additionally, the separatist movement that started last century is not simply about 
incorporation of the former kingdom of Pattani into the modern Thai nation-state, but 
about the nature of this incorporation.  The manner in which the Thai government has 
tried to accomplish this has everything to do with the current crisis.   
The next chapter surveys Thailand’s Malay-Muslim demography today.  It is 
evident from this survey that the economies of the southernmost provinces still lag 
behind the majority of Thai provinces.  Economic development of the Malay-Muslim 
provinces took a backseat to that of the other Thai provinces for most of the twentieth 
century.  Political and social integration into the Thai state also ranks behind that of the 
other Thai provinces.  Politically, the southern provinces were often seen as a place to 
send central bureaucrats and politicians for punishment or because of incompetence.  
Socially, though Buddhists and Muslims in the southern provinces had lived together 
peacefully on the most fundamental level of day-to-day living, there has always existed 
minimal social contact between the two groups.  Furthermore, many Thais outside the 
region, particularly in the governing bureaucracy, always considered the Malay-Muslims 
to be “other”.  As is argued in the thesis, this abysmal failure of economic, social, and 
political incorporation of the southernmost provinces into the Thai state continues to 
provide fertile ground not only for a separatist movement, but also the furthered activities 
of radical transnational Islamic entities.     
This thesis then looks at the development of insurgency in the South.  Starting 
with the earliest incidents of armed insurgency, it traces the founding, goals, and 
operations of significant separatist groups until the present.  It then attempts to sort out 
what is and is not known about the current operational status of these groups and any new 
5 
actors in the current turmoil in order to address exactly who is behind the current 
violence.  As such, though the exact picture is still murky, it seems that several separatist 
groups have a role in this latest violence.  It also appears that the Barisan Revolusi 
Nasional (BRN)-Coordinat and the Gerakan Mujahideem Islam Pattani (GMIP) are 
among the primary groups involved.  As for the current exact role of external groups, 
especially transnational terrorist groups like Jemaah Islamiah (JI) or Al Qaeda, the 
picture is even less clear.  What is known is that there does continue to be foreign funding 
for the secessionist movement, including money coming from Middle East countries, 
often crossing the porous Malaysian-Thai border into the southernmost provinces.  
Hence, given the lack of concrete evidence as to who all the actors are and what their 
exact roles are, the prospect for conflict resolution is further diminished.  
After having examined the history of Malay-Muslim relations with the Thai state, 
the current demography of the Pattani region, and the development of secessionism in the 
area, this thesis then assesses the core causes of the currently rekindled unrest in southern 
Thailand.  As such, the argument is that the kindling wood for burning was already 
present in the historical grievances that are still present in the region.  The Thai 
government, in its failed policies towards the region beginning in 2001 and 
mismanagement of the current unrest, in combination with the spreading global radical 
Islamist movement, catalyzed by 9/11, provided a dual spark that ignited this kindling 
wood.  The gross mismanagement of the current crisis by the Thai government has 
continued to add wood to the fire.  Parallels to all of Thaksin’s failed policies and conflict 
mismanagement can be found in the history of Thailand’s Pattani problem, indicating that 
at the heart of this crisis is a failure to learn from past mistakes and successes, a failure to 
learn from history. 
What is needed most for conflict resolution is that the Thai government concretely 
admit the exact nature of the problem and steadfastly decide to take all the necessary 
steps towards resolution.  The solution may lie not in any previously uncharted ideas, but 
rather in enacting ideas that have already been advanced by others, ideas on which the 
government previously failed to act.  Nonetheless, given the way the current Thai 
government has aggravated existing historical grievances, the assessment for peace in the 
short term is not promising, with a greater probability that the situation will continue to 
6 
worsen.  An external state power, able to guide the Thai government in its conflict 
management and generation of a strategic policy that addresses the genuine causes of the 
crisis, may be required to initiate conflict resolution.  This has important implications for 
United States government policy towards this situation.  Extreme caution is given that the 
United States government, in its zeal to combat transnational terrorism driven by an 
existing radical Islamic element, not make a pact with the devil in overlooking the current 
Thaksin regime’s move away from democratic consolidation and the rule of law, and 
towards greater authoritarianism, in order to check the spread of transnational terrorism 
into southern Thailand.  As such, the United States government will have to carefully 
tread between both dangers. 
The current Thai government is certainly not the first government to ever fail to 
learn the lessons of history.  However, given the current state of unrest in the Pattani 
region, along with the existing threat of transnational terrorism knocking on the door, it 
will be forced to learn its lessons quickly in order to solve the crisis and bring stability to 
the region.  If it does not, the rekindled Pattani problem may completely spread out of 





























Figure 1. Thailand Today 6
                                                 
6 Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas: www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/. 
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Available evidence suggests the former kingdom of Pattani, interestingly 
originally a Buddhist kingdom before later adopting Islam at the start of the Ayutthaya 
period, emerged from an earlier kingdom named Langkasuka.  Srivijaya, the kingdom 
from which arose the later Malay kingdoms in the Malacca region, exerted control over 
Langkasuka in the eighth through eleventh centuries.  After the decline of Srivijaya in the 
twelfth century, Langkasuka was again autonomous.  Pattani emerged from Langkasuka 
in the latter half of the fourteenth century; at approximately the same time Sukhotai 
began exerting its power to the north.7       
 
 
A. AYUTTHAYA PERIOD, 1569-1767 8  
 
The relationship between Islam and the Thai state extends back several centuries.  
Islam like Buddhism is not indigenous to Thailand.  It was trade that first brought Islam 
to Siam during the Ayutthaya period.  The Siamese Ayutthaya kingdom rose to power at 
the same time Islamic trade was dominant in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Malay 
states.  The economic strength of this trade was in large part responsible for the first 
major wave of Islamization in Southeast Asia. 
At that time, the Siamese political structure can best be described as eclectic and 
practical.  It had already successfully incorporated major elements of Brahmanism from 
an earlier Mon-Khmer culture with Tai Hinayana Buddhist practices and beliefs.  The 
large numbers of non-Buddhists and non-Tais who maintained influential roles within the 
political and economic structures further illustrate Ayutthaya’s pragmatism and 
eclecticism.  Malays, Persians, Chinese, Indians, Japanese and Portuguese among others 
could all be found at some level of royal service.9  A positive aspect of this is that it 
helped keep Ayutthaya directly linked to the politics and economics of the entire region. 
 
7 For a more in-depth elaboration of this early history, see George Coedes, The Indianized States of 
Southest Asia, ed. Walter F. Vella, trans. Susan B. Cowing (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1968).  
8 For Thai historical periods, I use the dates given in David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). 
9 Omar Farouk Shaeik Ahmad Bajunid, “The Political Integration of the Thai-Islam” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Kent at Canterbury, 1980), 110.  
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One of the most significant events leading into the Ayutthaya period was the 
conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1511.10  Malacca was until then one of the 
most important commercial centers of regional trade.  Under Portuguese control Malacca 
lost most of its economic relevance and became primarily a military outpost.  This in 
effect had two important consequences.  First, Ayutthaya assumed the role of the region’s 
most significant international trade center.  Indian, Chinese, Persian and European goods 
flowed through Ayutthaya in significant numbers.  As various observers noted at the 
time, Muslims were the most firmly entrenched in the trade streaming through 
Ayutthaya.11  Islam immediately found favor in the Ayutthaya royal court.12  In fact an 
increase in the role of Muslims in service to the royal court accompanied the increased 
importance of Ayutthaya.  Numerous Muslims assumed influential roles as ministers, 
merchants, and advisors to successive kings.13  Second, Malacca’s former vassals, among 
which was Pattani, benefited from the redirecting of trade from Malacca to Ayutthaya.  It 
allowed Pattani itself to economically develop into a robust trade center. 
The Islamic population in Ayutthaya grew more heterogeneous than it ever had 
been.  The Muslims present in the kingdom included Persians, Indians, Arabs, Chams, 
Moors, Acehnese, and Malays.  Malays were among the most numerous.  All these 
groups together made the Muslims the largest foreign nationality in Ayutthaya.  Several 
historians maintain the Muslims were the most favored foreign group and were actually 
the only foreign group offered the direct protection of the king.14  
The presence of so many ethnicities and religions in the Ayutthaya kingdom, 
including the preferential status of the Muslims, led to the adoption of a policy of 
tolerance.  The Ayutthaya monarchy recognized the multi-cultural, multi-religious 
 
10 Ronald Provencher, “Islam in Malaysia and Thailand,” in The Crescent in the East, ed. Raphael 
Israeli (London: Curzon, 1982), 144. 
 
11 Bajunid, 111. 
12 Yoneo Ishii, “Thai Muslims and the Royal Patronage of Religion,” Law & Society Review 28, no. 3 
(1994): 454-455. 
 
13 Wyatt, 108.  One such example was the well-known Sheikh Ahmad whom the king had appointed 
as his minister of foreign trade and affairs.  Sheik Ahmad’s position held great responsibilities, including 
the collection of import and export duties and the oversight of international shipping.  Sheikh Ahmad is but 
one example of of the numerous Muslims during the Ayutthaya period who were successful in not only 
securing important positions in trade but also chief political appointments.  
14 Bajunid, 114. 
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presence in Siamese society and understood its importance to the kingdom.  Although 
Buddhism was the religion of the kingdom, this did not come at the expense of any other 
religion.  There existed no effort to force a certain set of values on everyone.15  
Islam did eventually fall out of favor in the latter part of the Ayutthaya period, 
however.  The undoing of the significant level of influence and authority Muslims had 
achieved in the economic and political structures was primarily due to an attempt by 
foreign Muslim states, such as Persia, at proselytizing the Siamese population, including 
the Ayutthaya rulers.16  Though the Ayutthaya monarchy had displayed great openness to 
peaceful coexistence with the variety of ethnicities and religions, they simply would not 
tolerate such an attempt at conversion from Buddhism to Islam.  The undertaking of 
conversion efforts was in many ways as much an attempt to further Islamic political 
power as it was to spread the faith.  This Islamic attempt at proselytism resulted in the 
permanent decline of Muslim influence in the Siamese state, never again to be restored.17
What is interesting to note is that the early Muslim attempt to force their 
particular ideology on the Siamese culture, which though heterogeneous held a very 
different system of beliefs and practices, is somewhat analogous to the twentieth century 
Thai attempt to force its notion of Thai-ness on the Malay-Muslim population in southern 
Thailand.  There were of course fundamental differences.  In the first instance, external 
states sought to religiously assimilate a foreign population into the greater pan-Islamic 
world, while in the latter a state sought to culturally assimilate part of its internal 
population.  Nevertheless, both attempts abandoned any effort at peaceful coexistence in 
their assimilation efforts.  Likewise, both efforts resulted in utter failure that was to reap 
negative consequences for the attempter of assimilation.  As shall be argued later in this 
thesis, the twentieth century attempt at assimilation by the Thai state is still one of the 
causes of the violent unrest gripping southernmost Thailand today. 
With the fall of Malacca and its own further economic development, Pattani 
unwillingly became a tributary state to Ayutthaya.  Even though it was not long removed 
from its previous Buddhist identity, Pattani felt no particular allegiance to, indeed no 
 
15 Ishii, 454. 
16 Bajunid, 115. 
17 Ibid, 119. 
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shared culture with, Ayutthaya.  The kingdom strongly resented taking a subordinate role 
to Ayutthaya, especially given its own status as a growing trade center.18  This 
resentment is illustrated by centuries of Pattani rebellion against the Thai state.   
The historical importance of the tributary system, a practice that started in the 
region even before the first wave of Islamization, cannot be overstated.  Practically every 
Southeast Asian state participated in this system.  These states were not the unitary, 
territorially demarcated states that exist today.  Political borders were usually unstable 
and geographic boundaries often overlapped each other.19  The strength of kingdoms 
could be measured by the extent to which they gained the tribute status of outlying states.  
The stronger a state, the wider its suzerainty spread and the more states it brought under 
tributary status. 
This system in essence was one of traditional patronage and protection on the 
state level.  The powerful states gained tribute from weaker states either through coercion 
or voluntary submission by a tributary ruler hoping to consolidate his own power while 
being protected from his enemies.  Tribute was paid in order to ensure a large degree of 
autonomy and regime survival.  This intent on the part of the state paying tribute, that of 
independence, was usually upheld by the more powerful state in that it did not interfere in 
the internal affairs of the tributary state.  Some states even paid tribute to several different 
states at the same time.  As power shifted between these early Southeast Asia states, so 
did tributary relations.20
Pattani, seeking to reassert its full autonomy, fought several battles with 
Ayutthaya in the latter half of the sixteenth century and first few decades of the 
seventeenth century.  Pattani was actually able to periodically reassert its independence 
during this time.  After a massive military campaign launched by Ayutthaya in 1632, with 
Pattani holding its own ground, the Siamese throne sent representatives to affect a 
diplomatic solution.  At that time, Pattani had just undergone a succession of rulers and 
 
18 Clive J. Christie, A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism, and 
Separatism (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), 174. 
19 For detailed works on the creation and role of Thailand’s border, see Thongchai Winichakul, Siam 
Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994) and  
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities ( London: Verso, 2003). 
20 Bajunid, 142. 
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the new one was more focused on trade than war.  Thus, peace was established between 
the two kingdoms, which lasted until the start of the Chakri dynasty.   
  Two critical lessons should be learned from this early period.  First, from the 
first wave of Islamization in Southeast Asia, there did not exist any conflict between 
Buddhism and Islam.  The Siamese rulers accepted Islam for what it was and allowed it 
to peacefully coexist with Buddhism.  Indeed, in many aspects, Islam found particular 
favor in the Siamese court.  It was not until the Islamic attempt at proselytism that there 
existed any tension between Islam and Buddhism.  This tension was essentially much 
more political than religious.  Second, Pattani as a kingdom had practically always been a 
tributary state to another power.  The resentment at having another state exert power over 
it thus dates back centuries.  However, through the Ayutthaya period, the tributary status 
of Pattani was one that allowed it to not only keep its own culture in order, but also 
maintain its own rulers.  The states that claimed suzerainty over Pattani never interfered 
with Pattani’s ruling elites.  This policy changed at the start of the Bangkok period.  As 
will be seen, this led to even greater resentment by Pattani. 
 
  
B. BANGKOK PERIOD, 1767-1910 
  
In 1785, the Siamese successfully repelled a massive Burmese invasion.  Rama I 
had called upon Pattani to aid in the defense of Bangkok, but Pattani under the reign of 
Sultan Mohammad refused.  Infuriated, the Siamese followed their defeat of the Burmese 
with an overwhelming attack against Pattani.  Thousands of Pattani lives were lost and 
the Siamese returned to Bangkok with numerous war prisoners.   
At this time it was strategically important for the Siamese to ensure control of 
Pattani.  If the Burmese gained control of Pattani, they would have a forward base of 
operations south of Bangkok, offering manpower, food supplies, and logistics, which 
would enable them to attack Bangkok from a second direction.  Rama I therefore 
imposed a strictly enforced suzerainty over Pattani.  This required the raja to travel to 
Bangkok every three years and pay tribute with the traditional symbolic trees of gold and 
silver.   
13 
                                                
Pattani immediately resisted so the Siamese invaded Pattani again and imposed a 
new ruler upon it.21   The new ruler installed in 1785 organized renewed resistance 
against the Siamese throne, so the Siamese invaded again in 1791 and installed a different 
ruler.22  Bangkok this time created a new administrative position for a central Siamese 
overseer to the Pattani administration.  Furthermore, Buddhist Thais were settled in the 
Pattani state as a means to quell future rebellion.23  
Nonetheless, Pattani launched an offensive against Bangkok in 1808.  At this time 
Pattani had expelled all Siamese from its territory.  Siam once again defeated Pattani.  It 
this time directly appointed a Thai Buddhist to rule Pattani.  Rebellion continued to 
increase.  Tired of this non-stop rebellion and having security concerns elsewhere, 
Bangkok compromised with Pattani in 1817.  Siam divided the Pattani kingdom into 
seven smaller states and reinstated the authority of Malay-appointed rulers.24   
The relative peace that ensued did not last two decades.  On the heels of the 1826 
Burney Treaty,25 the seven Pattani states united to attempt ending Siamese rule.  This 
revolt also failed as the Siamese subdued Pattani a year later.  New Bangkok-chosen 
governors were again appointed to rule each of the seven minor states. 
This failed to subdue Pattani.  The states of Pattani again took part in a larger 
rebellion at the end of 1838 and were again repelled by the Siamese in early 1839. 
Frustrated with this continued rebellion, Siam under Rama III decided to alter its 
approach with the Malay region.  It again abandoned the policy of ruling the region with 
Siamese governors and allowed Malay rajas to rule their states.  This new policy 
succeeded in bringing order and stability to the Pattani region and remained that way for 
most of the remaining century.26  
 
21 Wyatt, 151. 
22 Ibid, 158. 
23 Bajunid, 142. 
24 Wyatt, 172. 
25 In this treaty, the British not only recognized Siamese rights over Pattani, but also the Malay states 
of Kelantan, Kedah, and Trengganu.  Thus, these Malay states were effectively subject to even more rigid 
Siamese control. 
26 Wyatt, 173. 
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In the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, Britain pressured Siam to 
tighten control over its outlying provinces.27  This resulted in the most direct rule of 
Pattani to date.  Siam sent commissioners to account for every petty chieftain’s court.  
These commissioners had a say in every move Pattani made.  They even took control of 
Pattani’s revenue administration.  Outraged, the Pattani states again revolted in 1902.  
Abdul Kadir, the raja of Pattani, sought British help, though to no avail.  The Siamese 
arrested the raja, effectively putting down the rebellion.28  In 1906, seeking better 
administrative control, Siam reorganized the seven states of Pattani into the four 
provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and Saiburi. 
The old ruling families of Pattani had become severed from their traditional social 
context.  The old social, economic, and political order was being undercut.  Old ruling 
families were being displaced.  They either had their revenues taken away or restricted by 
new accounting procedures.  Old patron-client relations disintegrated.  The centuries-old 
structure of raja rule was shattered.29  As a result the former ruling elite were among the 
most disgruntled with Siamese governance. 
In March 1909, a treaty between Siam and Britain established the current border 
between Thailand and Malaysia, giving Thailand what had been the kingdom of 
Pattani.30  Under the treaty terms, Siam transferred to Britain its previously held rights of 
suzerainty over its other Malay states: Kelantan, Kedah, Trengganu, and Perlis.31  Pattani 
is the only former Muslim vassal of Siam to be incorporated into the Thai state.32
 
27 Fear of Britain expanding its territory of influence was a motivating force for Thai rulers not only at 
this time, but also immediately following the Second World War. 
28 Bajunid, 213. 
29 Ibid, 214. 
30 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003), 77. 
31 Wyatt, 206. 
32 Satun, also formally incorporated into the Thai state in the 1909 treaty, had formerly been a vassal 
of the Malay state Kedah. 
 
Figure 2. Thailand-Malaysia Border Since 1909 33
 
Thus, during the Bangkok period, the former Ayutthaya model of indirect control 
of Pattani was firmly replaced by one of greater control through direct interference in 
state affairs.  This new model often relied on the use of physical force to achieve 
territorial consolidation.  Among the mid-peninsular Malay states, though unrest and 
revolt were widespread, Pattani always resisted Siamese control the most.  Once again, 
this resistance was for political ends.  However, the Pattani elites did use religious 
sentiment as a major tool to foment this popular resistance to Siamese control.34        
Traditional Malay-Muslim education was first directly effected during this 
Bangkok era.  Pattani had emerged as the foremost center of Islamic education in the 
Malay world.35  During the nineteenth century many students fled Pattani to study in 
Penang because Siamese authorities, fearing Islamic schools in Pattani were being used 
to stir revolt, cracked down on these institutions.  Many noted Muslim scholars from 
Pattani also fled to other Malay states.  The Thai government made further intrusions into 
the Malay-Muslim education system throughout the twentieth century, each time 
resulting in the furthering of Malay-Muslim resentment.  
A recurring theme is readily evident throughout this period.  Whenever the 
Siamese government attempted more direct rule of Pattani, heightened rebellious reaction 
ensued.  The times when Siam and Pattani were able to maintain a semblance of peace 
were when the Siamese government was not directly acting in the affairs, primarily the 
governance, of Pattani.  Nevertheless, the Siamese believed it important to follow a 
15 
                                                 
33 Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas: www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/. 
34 Bajunid, 148. 
35 Ibid, 150. 
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policy of greater control of Pattani for the majority of this period; thus, the period was 
one of almost constant rebellion by Pattani. 
A final lesson to be drawn from this time period is that from the outset of Siamese 
attempts to rule Pattani with Siamese administrators, no attempt was made to understand 
the culture and society of those being ruled.  A government that does not understand the 
people it is ruling will likely fail.  The Thai government continued throughout the 
twentieth century to send administrators from Bangkok to Pattani who had no 
understanding of the local culture.  This is one of the many historical reasons for 
resentment, which the Malay-Muslims still harbor towards the Thai government.     
 
 
C. RISE OF NATIONALISM, 1910-1957 
 
The Malay-Muslims in the newly annexed region continued to rebel against 
Siamese rule in a series of uprisings between 1909 until 1932.36  Several of these 
uprisings did turn violent, most notably the Pattani Revolt in February and March 1923.   
Additionally, 1910 began a period of even greater centralization efforts by the Thai 
government.  Rama VI, who ruled for fifteen years beginning in 1910, was largely 
responsible for this.  He was the first ruler to extend a stronger nationalist bent to the 
modernization efforts of his two predecessors.  Greater centralization was at the heart of 
his nationalist efforts.  Having just been officially brought into the Siamese state against 
their will, fighting to maintain their individual cultural identity, it was only natural that 
the Malay-Muslims would revolt against greater centralization efforts.  It should be 
noted, however, that Rama VI did not engage in any concerted effort to force a Siamese 
cultural and religious identity upon the newly annexed Pattani region.  An example of 
this is the Education Act of 1921, which though requiring the teaching of Thai in schools, 
in practice placed “no bars…on instruction in Thai”.37  
The year 1932 marked the start of a new era in Siamese history.  A noted coup 
that year brought an end to absolute monarchy and ushered in the opportunity for 
democratic development.  Having been reorganized a final time that year into the current 
 
36 Christie, 175. 
37 Bajunid, 162. 
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provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, the Malay-Muslims hoped this would be an 
opportunity for greater representation of themselves in their own political, economic, and 
cultural affairs.  However, as the result of the 1932 coup revealed itself, the notion of 
popular sovereignty did not apply to the Malay-Muslims.38  The opposite soon became 
reality as ultra-nationalism accompanied centralization.  The existing move towards 
greater centralization, though begun in earnest under Rama I, now rapidly accelerated.  
Furthermore, the Siamese state under absolute monarchy had primarily required mere 
obedience from its subjects.  In the new Siamese nation, this previous relationship of 
state-subject became one of nation-citizen.39  In the advancement of this new concept, the 
central Siamese government allowed little room for the coexistence of a Malay-Muslim 
identity. 
Pattani experienced the apex of this ultra-nationalism under the regime of Prime 
Minister Phibun Songkhram that began in 1938.  Gaining power as the result of another 
military coup, Phibun immediately launched a campaign to eliminate the Malay-Muslim 
cultural identity for the sake of nationalism.  This campaign assaulted the Malay-Muslim 
identity on all fronts, including the arenas of education, language, dress, and religious 
practices.  At the same time the new regime forced an ultra-nationalist agenda on the 
Malay-Muslims, it also advanced a program of modernization for which the Pattani 
people were not prepared. For the next four years starting in 1939, Phibun enacted a 
series of regulations for Thailand40 called the Ratthaniyom that affected into law the 
attack on the Malay-Muslim identity.  These laws were a uniform attempt to create a 
uniform language and social behavior.  Rattaniyom 3, passed on 2 August 1939, is but 
one of many examples of these: 
As the government is of the opinion that the name by which the Thais in 
some part of the country have been called do not correspond to the name 
of the race and the preference of the people so called and also that the 
appellation of the Thai people by dividing them into many groups…is not 
 
38 Actually, under strict military rule for much of the twentieth century, the idea of popular 
sovereignty remained unlived by the Thai society as a whole. 
39 Christie, 176. 
40 In 1939, as an internal as well as external show of ultra-nationalism, the Phibun administration 
officially changed the name of the country from Siam to Thailand, meaning land of the Thais, thus 
emphasizing the primacy of a singular cultural identity. 
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appropriate, for Thailand is one and indivisible, it thereby notifies that the 
state preference is as follows: 1.) Do not call the Thais in contradiction to 
the name of the race or the preference of those referred to, and 2.) Use the 
word ‘Thai’ for all of the Thais without any of the above-mentioned 
divisions.41
It is evident that this law attacked all who were not ethnically Thai.42  Note the 
suggestion that it is the preference of the majority ethnicity that is behind this agenda.  As 
earlier footnoted, popular sovereignty was at best limited during this time.  Thus, the 
reality was that it was Phibun and his cohorts who maintained this preference. 
Further laws required the use, and actual veneration, of the Thai language in all 
facets of society.  These were immediately enforced.  The practicality of these laws and 
their immediate enforcement in the Pattani region was ridiculous.  The vast majority of 
Malay-Muslims could not speak any Thai.  These laws were a direct affront to the Malay-
Muslims.  It was one thing to require the use of the Thai language in daily business or 
administrative reactions.  This was bad enough.  It was an entirely different matter to 
require that Thai be used in the homes and the pondoks of the Malay-Muslims. 
Phibun, fearing pondoks as havens of rebellious teaching and behavior,  
especially tried to enforce the use of the Thai language in all pondoks in the South.  Done 
to force Thai cultural assimilation, it had a reverse impact and effectively mobilized 
pondoks as centers for spreading ideas of pan-Malay nationalism and Islamic 
revivalism.43  Malay nationalism had during this period been growing throughout Malaya 
and Indonesia.  The Malay-Muslims had long maintained strong cultural and familial ties 
with the Malays across their southern border.  Phibun’s policies caused the Malay-
Muslims to further turn towards their Malay brothers and sisters in seeking not merely 
further understanding, but help in their plight. 
The assimilation efforts of the Phibun regime were so severe they even attempted 
to regulate the daily routines of all Thais.  Ratthaniyom 11, dealing strictly with daily 
activities, was the epitome of these efforts.  This regulation stated what all Thais should 
 
41 Bajunid, 168. 
42 In actuality, the pervading ultra-nationalism was as much an attempt to eliminate a unique Chinese 
identity as well as Malay-Muslim identity. 
43 Joseph Liow, “Bangkok’s Southern Discomfort: Violence and Response in Southern  
Thailand,” IDSS Commentaries 14 (2004): 2. 
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be doing during each part of the day, how many meals to eat, how many hours to sleep, 
the proper types of exercise, and how to spend holidays.44  Such a fascist program only 
served to further alienate the Malay-Muslims.  They viewed this as an unjustified attempt 
at total cultural subjugation.45
Phibun also attacked the traditional institution of Islamic law.  In the provinces of 
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, he completely eliminated both the Sharia Court and the 
Muslim Qadhi.  Administration of civil law in accordance with the precepts of Islamic 
law was an essential religious-cultural feature of the Malay-Muslims.  The abolishment 
of these institutions was a direct affront on Islam as well as the Malay culture.  Phibun 
also revoked the legal traditions of marriage and inheritance.  The government forced all 
Malay-Muslims under Thai civil jurisdiction.  Thus, Thai civil courts had full legal 
control over Islamic matters.  Malay-Muslim ire continued to grow.46   
Phibun’s first reign as prime minister ended in 1944.  Under Phibun, Thailand had 
sided with the Japenese during the Second World War, largely to regain territories 
previously lost to European colonialism, and to further his ultra-nationalist goals.  Now 
that the end of the war was a year away, and the inevitability of an Allied victory 
increased, the Thai government grew fearful that the British would enact severe 
repercussions on them for their wartime allegiance.  This fear included the possibility of 
Britain annexing Pattani.   
Therefore, the Thai government for the next few years largely reversed the policy 
course of the Phibun regime.  In 1945 the government passed the Patronage of Islam Act.  
This created several new Islamic entities, to include a royally appointed leader of Islam in 
Thailand called the Chularajmontri, a National Council for Islamic Affairs, and 
equivalent provincial-level councils for those areas with a majority population of 
Muslims.  The new government also restored the previously abolished Friday religious 
holiday.  Additionally, the government passed new legislation that allowed the 
application of Islamic law in the arenas of marriage and inheritance.  Though these new 
policies reversed Phibun’s former policy course, the Malay-Muslims doubted the 
 
44 Phibun had earlier abolished the Islamic Friday holiday. 
45 Bajunid, 170-171. 
46 Ibid, 177. 
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sincerity of the Thai government.  They were able to see the reversed course for what it 
was, an artificial attempt at pacification of both the Malay-Muslims and a statement 
towards the British that Thailand was indeed a good administrator to the Pattani region.47
Believing it futile to seek improvement to their repressed conditions from within 
the Thai government, the end of the Second World War offered the Malay-Muslims a 
hopeful chance to seek external aid from the British.  Several Malay-Muslims had aided 
the British with their war efforts against the Japanese.  They were hoping the British 
would reward their efforts with recognition of and aid for their plight.  Thus, in 
November 1945, they sent a petition, authored by several of the former elites, to the 
British Secretary of State for the Colonies.48  This petition enumerated their many 
grievances against the Thai government and asked the British to free them from Thai 
rule.  
Many of the grievances expressed in the petition are the same as those being 
expressed today, more than half a century later.  These include lack of serious 
consideration for the Malay-Muslim culture, extra-judicial killings by police, corruption 
by Bangkok-appointed administrators, denial of equal higher education opportunities, 
exclusion from participatory governance in local affairs, discrimination against the 
religion of Islam, and lack of regional economic development.  The fact that these same 
grievances still exist in the Malay-Muslim community today illustrate the historical 
failure of the Thai government to seriously address root problems that exist between the 
Malay-Muslim community and Thai state. 
To the further disgruntlement of the Malay-Muslim community, Britain failed to 
act on its petition and Phibun regained the premiership for almost another full decade 
starting in April 1948.  When word of the probable return of Phibun spread through the 
Pattani region in early 1948, the people’s anger turned violent as upwards of eighty 
villagers scuffled with Thai police forces at Dusun Nyor in Narathiwat province.  Within 
a couple days the number of villagers involved in this skirmish rose to almost one 
thousand, many of them armed.  It took police numerous reinforcements and a couple 
more days before they could restore order.  By the end, both sides had suffered many 
 
47 Christie, 182. 
48 Ibid, 178-179. 
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casualties.  This incident at Dusun Nyor49 was the first post-Second World War large-
scale revolt by the Malay-Muslims.  It marked the beginning of armed insurgency within 
southern Thailand.50
The general situation in the region worsened after this incident.  Police retaliation 
was often brutal.  At this time several Malay-Muslims fled over the Malaysia border to 
gather support for a protracted insurgency against the Thai government.  Local agitation 
continued.  In September 1948, Phibun declared a state of emergency in the region.  
Though the government publicly announced the threat of communist insurgency as the 
cause of this declaration, the real reason was to initiate a large crackdown on the region 
through a show of force.  Security forces including police and military conducted 
“exercises” in the region.  Phibun believed he could strong-arm the region into 
submission. 
At the same time, the second Phibun regime did appear, on the surface, to 
combine this show of force with more concessions to the region.  He sent a chain of 
special commissions from Bangkok to hear the grievances of the locals.51  And indeed 
some concessions resulted from these, such as the insurance that Malay could be used in 
school instruction and that Bangkok-appointed administrators to the region would receive 
proper training in cultural understanding of the Malay-Muslims.  Nevertheless, Phibun’s 
end goal was still the cultural assimilation of the region for a nationalist agenda.52  The 
ultra-nationalist Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram, in advancing his agenda, had failed 
to regard the existing cultural, social, or political realities in all areas of the country, 
particularly the South.  The lack of any attempt to truly understand the culture and needs 
of the Pattani community, a hallmark of the Pattani problem during the onset and rise of 
the Bangkok period, continued as a hallmark of this nationalist period.  Previous attempts 
of somewhat forced integration became attempts at full-bore assimilation during the 
nationalist period.  Bangkok-appointed administrators earned a widespread local 
 
49 This incident is also known as the Mandi Minyak incident. 
50 Bajunid, 186. 
51 The Thai government did the very same in 2004.  As will be later highlighted, this would not be 
required if an organization such as the Southern Border Provincial Administration Center SBPAC) still 
existed.  
52 Surin Pitsuwan, “Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern 
Thailand” (Ph.D. diss., Thammasat University, 1985), 155-156. 
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reputation for ineptness and corruption.  Police forces, the majority of them originally 
from outside the Pattani area, earned a reputation for cruelty and extra-judicial killings.  
The unrest in southern Thailand had risen to a new level.  This period marked the start of 
the armed insurgency that gathered force and structure during the following Sarit regime.             
 
 
D. SARIT’S COUP ONWARDS, 1957-2001 
 
Across the southern border, a sense of national unity had been growing in Malaya.  
National pride in Malay ethnic identity continued to grow and in 1957, all regions in 
Malaya experienced their first taste of independence from British control, becoming the 
current-day independent state of Malaysia.  As the fate of the Malay-Muslims in the 
northern Malay states continued to improve, that of the Malay-Muslims in southernmost 
Thailand continued to worsen.  The Malay-Muslims grew in both their bitterness toward 
the Thai state and desire for their own autonomy.  Adding fuel to this was the better 
economic condition experienced by those in the northern Malay states as contrasted to 
that of the Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand. 
With this as a backdrop for the ongoing Patanni problem, Phibun was removed 
from office in 1957 as the result of yet another coup.  One of the primary leaders of this 
coup, Sarit Thanarat, took the Thai premiership in 1959.  The development and growth of 
an armed and organized secessionist movement entailing a number of insurgent groups 
marked his term in office, as well as those during the next couple decades.  The 
particulars of this secessionist movement will be covered in detail in a later chapter.  
What is important to note about the Sarit regime is the particular policy he adopted 
towards southernmost Thailand, which led to the organization of one of the region’s first 
secessionist groups. 
The Thai government under Sarit initiated a policy that enacted and enforced the 
strictest regulation of the pondoks to date.53  He justified this on paper by making the 
pondoks private institutions that would receive funding, but only at the cost of complete 
central government oversight by the Ministry of the Interior.  This example of yet further 
intrusion into Malay-Muslim affairs further raised resentment.  In response, many 
 
53 Ibid, 172, 188. 
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students sought overseas education, opening them up to previously unknown radical 
ideologies. Numerous pondoks moved underground.  Of the approximately 355 pondoks 
in the region at this time, 150 protested by temporarily closing down.  One pondok in 
Narathiwat, teachers and students alike, responded by fleeing the local area and initiating 
armed rebellion against the government.  This former pondok community became the 
first members of the separatist group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN).  
The next couple of decades were marked by continual secessionist violence in the 
southern provinces.  General instability and unrest across the Thai state as a whole during 
these two decades worsened matters for the Malay-Muslims.  There were several more 
coups resulting in nine changes in premiership over this two-decade period.  With a lack 
of stability in the government, no serious longer-term attempts could be made to right the 
wrongs in the Pattani region.  The succession of shorter-term premiers simply continued 
the past policies of general repression of the Malay-Muslims.  The South continued to be 
a repository for inept and corrupt Bangkok-appointed officials.          
The 1970’s were a decade of particularly great turbulence throughout the whole 
country.  The southernmost provinces were no exception to this.  As masses of 
demonstrators displayed their discontent for the government in the streets of Bangkok, 
masses of Malay-Muslims demonstrated their own discontent.  In November 1975, 
approximately 40,000 Malay-Muslims protested in the streets over the alleged extra-
judicial killing of five villagers by security forces.  In Pattani the next month, unidentified 
individuals threw a bomb into a crowd of Muslim protestors, killing eleven and wounding 
forty-four.  Later that same month, probably in retaliation for the Pattani bombing, two 
bombs were placed at Bangkok’s central airport and one exploded, killing four 
bystanders.  Immediately following, two bombs exploded at Hat Yai’s train station, 
injuring several.54
The unrest in the South manifested itself on 22 September 1977 in a direct attempt 
at the lives Thailand’s monarchy, King Bhumibol and his wife Queen Sirikit.  While on 
an official visit in Yala, two homemade bombs exploded in close proximity to the royal 
 
54 Peter Chalk, “Militant Islamic Separatism in Southern Thailand,” in Islam in Asia:Changing 
Political Realities, ed. Jason F. Isaacson and Colin Rubenstein (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
2002), 1062.  
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family.  They barely escaped injury, though five people were killed and forty-seven 
others injured.  Four Malay-Muslims were arrested and charged with this attack.55  This 
insurgent attack was one of the sparks for the subsequent coup of national leadership.56                
It was not until General Prem Tinsulanonda became prime minister in March 
1980 that the government enacted any serious attempts to bring order to the reigning 
chaos.  One of his most important contributions in this regard was his founding of the 
Southern Border Provincial Administration Center (SBPAC).  Established in 1981, one of 
its primary functions was the education of the Thai public on Malay-Muslim culture.57  It 
also served as a key advisory body to the central government.  The center was extremely 
successful in this capacity because it provided for a working interface between Bangkok 
and local provincial administrators.58  Much of the communications, which had broken 
down during previous decades, were thus restored.  Prem based this organization in Yala 
province, showing the Malay-Muslims that this was not simply another Bangkok-
centered initiative that would be unable to ascertain the needs and voices of the locals.     
Prem also, in an unprecedented move, offered amnesty to the separatists who 
continued to stir rebellion in the region.  He was successful in getting a large number of 
these secessionists to put down their arms.  He also at this time transferred control of the 
Pattani problem from the Defense Ministry to the Interior Ministry.  The Interior Ministry 
already had oversight of the Southern Borders Provincial Administration Center.  This 
move made the bold statement that he would deal with the Pattani region not as a matter 
of security, but as one of development. 
The 1990’s were a decade of relative peace in the southernmost provinces.  Many 
of Prime Minister Prem’s initiatives in the previous decade had proven effective.  The 
government had also successfully squashed the insurgent activities of both the 
Communist Party of Thailand and the members of the Communist Party of Malaysia who 
were operating inside its borders.  This seemed to further decrease the momentum gained 
 
55 These four later admitted they were members of PULO. 
56 Chalk, 1063. 
57 Liow, 2.      
58Aurel Croissant, “Unrest in South Thailand. Contours, Causes and Consequences Since  
2001,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, no. 1 (forthcoming 2005).  
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by separatist groups during the preceding few decades.  In the country at large, a new 
wave of democratic advancement was sweeping over the population.  The 1997 
constitution was a crowning achievement of that time.  Perhaps the Malay-Muslims 
believed that this time, they actually would have a representative voice in the 
government.  By the turn of the century, many analysts assessed that the newly found 
peace in the southernmost provinces was there to stay.  As it is, two key events in 2001 
sparked this dormant unrest and on 4 January 2004, the violence had exploded yet again.  
In general summation, the history of Malay-Muslims in Thailand has been one of 
ruler and ruled, with the pattern of rule advancing from tributary oversight to interference 
to assimilation to semi-accommodation.  The Malay-Muslims always wanted to maintain 
their own language, center their children’s education around Islamic education, 
traditionally manifested in the pondoks, and perhaps most importantly keep their legal 
and religious autonomy.59  It has been a continual battle against the Thai state to 
accomplish this.  The Thai government, in its attempts to incorporate the Pattani area into 
the larger Thai state, has consistently followed policies that failed to take into proper 
consideration the uniqueness, needs, and value of the Malay-Muslims.  As a result, 
resentment has festered in the Pattani region for quiet some time.  This resentment gave 
way to rebellion, which gave way to armed insurgency. 
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III. THAILAND’S MALAY-MUSLIM DEMOGRAPHY TODAY 
The last chapter examined the history of Malay-Muslim relations with the Thai 
state.  The unique Islamic identity of the Malay-Muslim population played a role in these 
relations, whether it was religious difference used by former Pattani elites to stir rebellion 
or used by the Thai government to focus cultural assimilation efforts.  Political identity 
has arguably exerted as large if not a larger influence in the Pattani problem.  Past Thai 
political leaders have followed an ultra-nationalist agenda that sought to assimilate the 
Malay-Muslims by attacking elements of their cultural identity, including language and 
pondok education.  The Malay-Muslim population has rigidly rallied around their unique 
ethnic-religious identity.  Economically, Pattani was once a wealthy trade center.  
Throughout almost a century of direct Thai rule, however, the central government 
neglected the economic development of the southernmost provinces, while the economic 
well being of the northern Malaysian provinces increased relative to these southern Thai 
provinces.  Thus, the history of Malay-Muslims towards the Thai state has largely been 
defined by the government’s assimilation attempts and the way these attempts were 
made, as well as neglect of the southernmost provinces, which in turn has caused severe 
resentment of the government. 
This thesis argues that these historic grievances still largely exist and that this fact 
has largely contributed to the rekindled insurgency.  In order to illustrate this, this chapter 
paints a picture of the three southernmost provinces today.  In so doing, the various 
demographic elements of this picture are analyzed, to include religion, society, economy, 
education, and politics.  As such, this current picture shows large-scale economic 
underdevelopment in which between a quarter and a third of the Malay-Muslim 
population in the southernmost provinces lives below the poverty line.  These Malay-
Muslims still hold firm to their ethnic-religious identity.  Though participatory in the 
national political process, they do not relate well to the current ruling administration, as 
indicated by the recent election voting data.  Education for many is still centered on the 
traditional pondoks, an institution that the Thai government is once again attempting to 
bring under complete state control.  As such, this picture shows that not much has 
changed within the southernmost provinces over the past century. 
A. RELIGION AND SOCIETY  
 
The total population of the three southernmost Thai provinces, which 
geographically lie the furthest distance from the capital of Bangkok, is approximately 
1.76 million60: about 690,000 in Narathiwat, 618, 000 in Pattani and 451,000 in Yala.61  
Malay-Muslims account for 1.3 million, or three-quarters, of this total population, and are 
thus the overwhelming ethnic-religious group in this region.  The Malay-Muslims in 
these three provinces account for just over forty percent of the total Islamic population of 
3.2 million in Thailand.62  With the addition of the large Malay-Muslim populations in 
the neighboring two provinces of Satun and Songkhla, well over half the Muslims in 
Thailand are located in the South.  This southern region of Thailand totals fourteen 
provinces: Nakhon Si Thammarat, Krabi, Phangnga, Phuket, Surat Thani, Ranong, 
Chumphon, Trang, Phatthalung, Songkhla, Satun, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.63   
 
Figure 3. Malay-Muslim Population in Thailand 64
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60 Thailand in Figures, 8th Edition, 2002-2003. Alpha Research Co., Ltd., 2003.   
61 Ibid.  These figures are current as of the December 2001 population census. 
62 Abuza, 76.  Muslims in Thailand total just less than five percent of the total national population. 
63 Thailand in Figures. 
64 Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas: www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/. 
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The three southernmost provinces are relatively small in physical size compared 
to those found in North and Northeast Thailand.  Pattani is the smallest of the three, 
measuring 1940.9 square kilometers.  With a population density of 319 people per square 
kilometer, Pattani is the ninth densest province of seventy-six.  Narathiwat and Yala are 
considerably larger, measuring 4475.4 square kilometers and 4521.1 square kilometers 
respectively.  This gives them a population density of 154 and 100 people per square 
kilometer.65   
These provinces have a woefully inadequate number of medical personnel and 
facilities.  This may be an indicator of the lack of robust higher educational opportunities 
in the region that limits locals from attaining such professional positions.  It may also be 
an indicator of the region’s inability to recruit such professionals from elsewhere in the 
country.  In Narathiwat, the number of physicians totals seventy-one, dentists fifteen, 
hospitals fourteen, and patient beds 666.  Thus, there is one doctor for every 9460 people 
and one dentist for every 44,777 people.  Pattani totals seventy-four physicians, twenty 
dentists, thirteen hospitals, and 725 patient beds.  This averages one doctor per 8220 
people and one dentist per 30,414 people.  In Yala, the number of physicians is eighty-
nine, dentists twenty-seven, hospitals nine, and patient beds 1122.  There is thus one 
doctor for every 4900 people and one dentist for every 16,152 people.66  Considering the 
already insufficient number of medical personnel in the region, the fact that the 2004 
violence forced many doctors to flee the area could have drastic consequences on the 
health and welfare of the southern population. 
Since 1932, every constitution of Thailand has to some degree affirmed the 
principle of freedom of conscience.  Nonetheless, until the 1997 constitution, Buddhism 
as the religion of ninety-five percent of the Thai populace was the official state religion.  
Thailand’s current constitution upholds the equal status of all religions within the Thai 
state.  Given the efforts towards democratic consolidation at the time it was written, this 
could indicate that the writers of the 1997 constitution, though maintaining the extreme 
importance of Buddhism to Thailand, understood that a single state religion is 
contradictory to democratic principles.  The king, though mandated by law and tradition 
 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid.  These figures are current as of the December 1999 census.  
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to be Buddhist, also maintains the role of upholder and protector of all religions.  Acting 
in this capacity, since the 1970’s, he and the royal family have taken regular trips to the 
southernmost provinces, even founding a palace in Narathiwat.   
Based on political significance as well as numbers, Islam is arguably the second 
most important religion in Thailand.  Thailand, like the rest of Southeast Asia, is home to 
predominantly secular Muslims.67  As such, the ideology of these Muslims should not be 
confused with the more radical variants populating many Middle East countries.68  
Ninety-nine percent of Thailand’s Muslims are Sunni.69  There are approximately 2000 
mosques in Thailand, over half of which are in the three southernmost provinces.  
Narathiwat has roughly 434 mosques, Pattani 421, and Yala 199.70  
The majority of Malay-Muslims continue to inhabit the rural areas as they have 
traditionally done.  Thais of Buddhist or Chinese affiliation primarily inhabit the urban 
areas.  Malay-Muslims have traditionally kept to themselves.  Several reasons account for 
this.  Among these are the norms of the religious traditions that hinder social interaction, 
such as specific eating requirements, presence of particular animals, and visibility of 
religious icons.  The Malay-Muslims also keep to themselves as a means to continue the 
centrality of the Malay-Muslim identity.   
Nevertheless, even given the lack of vibrant social interaction, living together in 
the same area requires all groups to relate to each other on a fundamental level.  On this 
level all segments of society had traditionally coexisted peacefully.71  With the elevation 
of violence and increased range in human targets exhibited over the past few years, 
however, this situation has changed.  Many of the local non-Malay-Muslims, while 
concurring they have traditionally lived together with the Malay-Muslims without any 
problems, admit that they now fear their Malay-Muslim neighbors.  This fear is largely 
 
67 Abuza, 3. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Joseph Liow, “The Security Situation in Southern Thailand: Toward an Understanding of Domestic 
and International Dimensions” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27 (2004): 533.  
 
70 Thailand in Figures, and Abuza, 80. 
71 This refers specifically to separatist violence as opposed to violence committed by insurgents, 
criminals, and general malcontents.  Separatist violence has traditionally targeted people in occupations that 
are symbolic of the Thai state, such as security officials, with few exceptions.  However, these exceptions 
have increased throughout 2004, ranging from Buddhist monks to schoolchildren. 
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caused by a lack of trust, which in turn has been caused by a simple lack of knowledge of 
exactly who has been behind the current unrest.  Many of the non-Malay-Muslims point 
to the year 2001 as the year when they first sensed a change in communal relationships.72
Language is another factor that has hindered not only local social interaction, but 
also state relations with the Malay-Muslims.  As suggested in the last chapter, language 
has been a major point of contention between the state and the local populace as forced 
usage of the Thai language had been a means of the state in its attempt at assimilation.  
Malay-Muslims have traditionally spoken a Malay dialect called Yawi.  To this day the 
vast majority, even the small percentage who know Thai, speak Yawi.  Maintaining their 
usage of Yawi in everyday life is an important way for them to maintain their cultural 
identity.  Thai for them remains simply a language necessary for official state 
communications. 
Language is one area in which the government should take a lesson from the 
Thai-Chinese community in the region.  The relations between the Thai-Chinese and the 
Malay-Muslims have always been particularly good.  This is largely because the Thai-
Chinese are actually proficient in Yawi, having made the effort to learn it to successfully 
conduct business with the majority populace.73
The Malay-Muslim population continues to maintain familial, social, and cultural 
ties with their Malay counterparts across the southern border.  In fact the practice of 
intermarriage between Malay-Muslims and Malays across the border is still common.  
This is a clear indication that the Malay-Muslim identity in southern Thailand remains 
extremely strong and of great importance.  It is also an indication that past integrationist 
efforts by the Thai government have largely failed.   
 
72 This information was collected in interviews conducted by the author while conducting thesis field 
research in the three southernmost provinces in the summer of 2004.  This fear was visibly evident, 
particularly in the urban areas.  Many Buddhists commented that, though they could not offer concrete 
evidence as to why, they knew as of a few years ago that there would be growing tensions between the 
Buddhist and Malay-Muslim populations.  As one example, a university student related how his mom, 
sensing this change of communal relations and intuiting that only worse would follow, relocated her family 
from the Betong area to Hat Yai in 2002. 
73 Bajunid, 45-46. 
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B. ECONOMY  
 
The economies of the southernmost provinces have always been among the 
poorest.  This embitters the Malay-Muslims for a few reasons.  First, they perceive that 
the Thai state has done little to develop the region, while concerting its efforts and 
finances in the other regions of Thailand.  Not only do they see the Thai state as having 
neglected the southern region, but also having outright plundered the region of its natural 
resource wealth, with financial benefits going back to Bangkok rather than remaining in 
the area.  Second, the Malay-Muslims look across their southern border and see that their 
ethnic kin are considerably more economically sound.  Historical records indicate the 
British, after gaining suzerainty over its colonial Malay states, did more to further the 
economic condition of them than Siam did with its Malay states.  Finally, they still 
remember the apex of their former kingdom’s glory several centuries ago when the 
economy was robust and wealth abounded.74  Such memories have not vanished from 
their cultural awareness.   
The southernmost provinces, being largely rural, have relied on agriculture as 
their economic mainstay.  With Pattani and Narathiwat having ready access to the Gulf of 
Thailand, fishing has also been of great importance.  The most important crop, by far, are 
rubber trees.  Rubber plantations abound throughout the region.  The average rubber tree 
yields one-half kilogram of rubber sap.  One kilogram of rubber sap earns forty-three 
baht.  Thus, it takes the yield of two rubber trees to earn the equivalent of one U.S. dollar.  
This is a dismal return.75   
Two major problems have plagued the region’s rubber production.  Domestically, 
the quality of the rubber trees has been poor, thus affecting their yield.  Internationally, as 
artificial rubber has become more important in the world market, the demand for natural 
rubber has substantially decreased.  The fishing industry has also had its woes.  The 
locals can only afford relatively smaller fishing vessels.  In the past few decades, an 
increase of larger commercial fishing vessels from Bangkok and elsewhere have come 
 
74 Kevin Hewison, “Thailand’s Malay-Muslims: The Deep South” Inside Asia 9 (July-August 1986): 
31. 
 
75 These figures were gathered by the author in visiting several rubber plantations in the southern 
provinces while conducting thesis field research during summer 2004.  In calculating U.S. equivalency, the 
exchange rate of 40 baht to the U.S. dollar is used. 
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into their area of the Gulf of Thailand and depleted the area of its fish.  The Malay-
Muslims with their smaller fishing boats have simply been unable to compete with the 
larger vessels. 
Measured in terms of gross provincial product (GPP), the economic well being of 
the provinces is poor.  At the turn of this century, as of December 1999, Narathiwat had a 
gross provincial product of 19,098 million baht.  This resulted in a 1.1 percent real gross 
provincial product growth and a 29,069 baht gross provincial product per capita.  Pattani 
by far had the highest gross provincial product of the three with 31,229 million baht.  
This yielded a gross provincial product per capita of 50,862 baht.  Nevertheless, this was 
considerably down from the previous year, affecting a real gross provincial product 
growth of -4.0 percent.  Yala experienced a gross provincial product of 16, 204 million 
baht.  This yielded a gross provincial product per capita of 39, 523 baht.  This too was 
considerably down from the previous year, resulting in a real gross provincial product 
growth of –3.7 percent.76
Many are the Malay-Muslims are living below the poverty line.  The statistics are 
telling in this regard.  As of the 2000 census, 25.5 percent of the people in Pattani, 28.1 
percent of those in Yala, and 35.1 percent of the people in Narathiwat are impoverished.  
This is an average of almost one in every three people in the southernmost provinces 
living below the poverty line.  The poverty incidence percentage for the southern region 
as a whole is 11 percent while that of the entire country is 14.2 percent.  Thus, the Malay-
Muslims have a much higher poverty rate than that of the kingdom as a whole and the 
rest of their southern region in particular.77      
Neither unemployment nor underemployment, though a factor, can account for 
this high level of poverty.  The unemployment rates for Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are 
2.4, 1.4, and 3.4 respectively.  This averages 2.4, which is 0.2 points lower than the 
 
76 Thailand in Figures. 
77 United Nations Development Program (UNDP). “Thailand Human Development Report 2003,” 
(Bangkok: UNDP, 2003).  The three southernmost provinces are also among a handful of provinces that 
have the lowest official minimum wage in Thailand.  The minimum wage there is less than 140 baht per 
day.  This is not an hourly minimum wage as in the United States, but the daily minimum wage.  
Furthermore, the workday is not defined as an eight-hour day as in many western countries, but as the 
entire twenty-four hour period.  To better put this into perspective, this is less than $3.50 over a three U.S. 
workday period.  It is true that the standard of living in southern Thailand is quite lower than that of the 
United States, but nevertheless it is easy to see how the locals might have difficulty staying above the 
poverty line. 
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country as an entirety.  The underemployment rates are 3.1, 1.4, and 2.5 respectively. 
This averages 2.3, which equals that of the entire country. 
Income level is the telling number of the extremely high poverty incidence in 
these three provinces.  Their average household income is 9065 baht per month.  This is 
considerably lower than that of the southern region as a whole, 11,012 baht per month, as 
well as that of the whole kingdom, 11,988 baht per month.  The three provinces’ per 
capita current income also lags behind the rest of the southern region and that of the 
entire kingdom.  The average per capita current income 2158 baht per month, compared 
to 2957 baht per month for the southern region and 3462 baht per month for all of 
Thailand.  In 1980, the per capita income of this region was 23 percent lower than the 
whole kingdom.78  These numbers suggest that over the past couple decades, the 
economy of the southernmost provinces relative to that of the whole nation has not at all 
improved.   
Vehicle ownership is often a physical sign of economic well being in developed 
and developing societies.  The number of cars owned by residents of the provinces is 
considerably low, whereas, paralleling much of the rest of Thailand, motorcycle 
ownership is a lot more common.  Residents of Narathiwat own a total of 7732 cars and 
259,823 motorcycles.  This yields one car per eighty-nine people and one motorcycle per 
three people.  Thirty-four motorcycles are seen for every one car.  Residents of Yala own 
a total of 8838 cars and 175,318 motorcycles.  This yields one car per fifty-one people 
and one motorcycle per three people.  Twenty motorcycles are seen for every car.  Pattani 
residents own a total of 7808 cars and 125,781 motorcycles.  This yields one car per 
seventy-nine people and one motorcycle per five people.  Sixteen motorcycles are seen 
for every car.  Given these numbers against the background of general economic well-
being, it is understandable why motorcycles are the vehicles of choice used to carry out 
insurgent assassin attacks as well as bombings.  Expect this trend to continue. 
Other indicators of modernization further show that the southernmost provinces 
rank behind the rest of Thailand and the southern region.  Kingdom-wide, 71.5 percent of 
residences have a refrigerator.  This number diminishes to 69.3 percent in Yala, 57.6 
percent in Narathiwat, and 54 percent in Pattani.  These percentages are even well below 
 
78 Hewison, 31. 
that of the South as a whole, in which 73.9 percent of dwellings have refrigerators.  
Additionally, 83.7 percent of dwellings in the South have a gas or electric stove.  The 
southernmost provinces rank below this: 74.7 percent of dwellings in Yala, 70.7 percent 
in Pattani, and 68.8 percent in Narathiwat have a gas or electric stove.79           
This thesis earlier stated that the economic well being of the southernmost Thai 
provinces has historically been worse than that of the northern Malaysia provinces, and 
that this has always been a source of resentment among Thailand’s Malay-Muslims.  
Current statistics show there is still a great economic disparity between the two.  A 
comparison of the poverty incidence rates of the three northern Malaysian provinces that 
share the border with the Pattani region, those being Kedah, Perak, and Kelantan, clearly 
illustrates this.  The poverty incidence rate for Kedah is 10 percent, 8 percent for Perak, 
and 12 percent for Kelantan.80  Thus, the average poverty rate of 10 percent for these 
three provinces is considerably lower than that of 30 percent for the southernmost Thai 
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79 UNDP, 2003. 
80 United Nations Development Plan (UNDP). “Malaysia Human Development Progress  
and Challenges Report 2004” (Kuala Lumpur: UNDP, 2004). 
81 Source: United Nations Development Plan. 
Urbanization is also a sign of socio-economic development.  The vast majority of 
the Malay-Muslims continue to live in rural areas as they have for the past century.  This 
accounts for the continued prominence of agriculture.  On the Malaysia side of the border 
however, the last three decades has seen a dramatic population shift of over 20 percent to 
urban areas.  Thus, currently 40 percent of Kedah, 35 percent of Kelantan, and 60 percent 
of Perak inhabitants live in urban areas.  This has translated to a decreased dependence on 
agriculture.  For example, in the most rural of these three provinces, Kelantan, only 30 
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Throughout the last century, many Malay-Muslims seasonally crossed the border 
for work.83  This is understandable given the better economic conditions across the 
border.  With today’s remaining economic disparity, many Malay-Muslims continue to 
find work across the border.  Such a practice reinforces the strong relationship between 
the Malay-Muslims of the two nations.  It also puts Thailand’s Malay-Muslims in contact 
with those more radical insurgents who find it easier to operate, or at least find 
accommodation and plan operations, on the south side of the border.   
 
82 Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas, www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/.  
83 Bajunid, 50. 
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C. EDUCATION 
 
As earlier mentioned, Pattani was a primary center for Islamic education up until 
the early twentieth century.  Muslim students from throughout Southeast Asia would seek 
education in the Pattani pondoks before traveling abroad, often to Islamic institutes of 
higher education in the Arab world, such as the Grand Mosque in Mecca, for further 
education. Many Malay-Muslims from Pattani were reputable teachers in these Islamic 
institutions abroad.  Pattani tok gurus84 were noted for translating religious teachings 
from Arabic into Yawi.  The Southeast Asian Islamic community greatly respected the 
Pattani pondoks for their sound adherence to the principles of Islam.     
Pattani’s status as a regional center for Islamic education changed as other 
regional centers of Islamic education developed around the world.  The quality of 
religious education in pondoks in the southernmost provinces still commands a good deal 
of respect from the local community.  Many locals, however, now send their children 
across the border for religious as well as secular Malay education.  Though some Malay-
Muslim parents have traditionally sent their children across the border for education,85 
direct government intrusions into the southern pondoks have largely forced this.     
In pondok schools, instruction is conducted in Malay and Arabic.  The emphasis 
is on learning Islam more than a secular curriculum.  Nonetheless, in the twentieth 
century, many Malay-Muslim pondoks did integrate secular and vocational subjects into 
the overall curriculum.  Religious lessons entail the students pray, memorize the Koran, 
and listen to exegesis and commentaries provided by the tok guru.  There is no 
performance-based assessment system in these schools.  This is a primary reason the Thai 
government has refused to accredit these pondoks.86  
Pondoks remain one of the most central symbols of the Malay-Muslim culture.  
Scholars continue to note how this Islamic system of education, centered on the pondoks, 
has successfully nurtured the Malay-Muslim consciousness in southern Thailand.87  The 
 
84 These are principals or teachers in pondoks who have been on Haj in Mecca. 
85 Bajunid, 50. 
86 Liow, Security Situation, 1. 
87 Joseph Liow, “The Pondok School of Southern Thailand: Bastion of Islamic Education or  
Hotbed of Militancy?” IDSS Commentaries 32 (2004): 1. 
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Thai government has always understood the central importance of pondoks within the 
Malay-Muslim community.  To eliminate the traditional role of pondoks is the same as 
eliminating the traditional culture in the minds of Thailand’s Malay-Muslims.  This is 
why twentieth century attempts by the Thai government, particularly under Phibun and 
Sarit, to transform the pondoks met with such widespread local opposition.  The local 
community responded to Thaksin’s threats last year to more directly control the pondoks 
with equally rigorous opposition.   
Given the long-standing symbolic as well as educational importance of pondoks, 
it is widely assumed that most Malay-Muslims today insist their children attend 
traditional pondoks rather than state schools.  Recent research conducted by Prince of 
Songkhla University in Pattani province indicates that 64 percent of Malay-Muslims want 
their children to have a comprehensive general education while at the same time 
balancing this with religious instruction.88  The emphasis here is that the majority of 
locals do not want secular education at the expense of religious education, but in addition 
to it.  They realize the importance of secular education to in improving their economic 
lot.  They want their children to be on par with the rest of the country. 
Much of the past conflict over pondoks centers on how and why the Thai 
government attempted secularization.  It is one thing for the government to register the 
pondoks in order to standardize the secular curriculum and provide federal funds.  There 
are currently 500 pondoks in southern Thailand, approximately 200 of which are 
unregistered with the Thai government.  It is another thing altogether for the government 
to register the pondoks as part of a larger assimilation scheme that would eliminate the 
region’s unique cultural identity.  The local Malay-Muslims can perceive the real intent 
behind the government’s actions. 
Whether local children attend pondoks or secular schools in either the southern 
provinces or across the border, it is still common practice for many to attend institutes of 
higher education overseas.  The Malay-Muslim community has long complained that it is 
especially difficult for these students to find employment upon returning to the local area.  
As such, many begin their own pondoks as a means to earn a living.  The difficulty of 




                                                
reasons why this difficulty exists is that the Thai Ministry of Education gives academic 
recognition to only a few foreign Islamic universities.89  
Secular education standards in the southernmost provinces are currently on par 
with the rest of the nation.  The average score for quality of education in lower secondary 
schools throughout the nation is 45.5, compared to 43.1 for the southern region, 48.6 for 
Pattani, 42.1 for Yala, and 39.8 for Narathiwat.  As for quality of education in upper 
secondary schools, the score stands at 36.4 for the entire kingdom, 35.7 for the southern 
region, 40.1 for Pattani, 39.1 for Yala, and 32.4 for Narathiwat.  This indicates the quality 
of education is actually as good if not better in Pattani and Yala than the whole of the 
region or nation.  The quality of education in Narathiwat, however, is lagging behind the 
other two southernmost provinces.90    
There is a discrepancy in the number of those who have not had any formal 
education.  While this number is 5.5 percent for the whole kingdom and 7.7 percent for 
the southern region, it is 17.5 percent for Pattani, 14.1 percent for Yala, and 20.1 percent 
for Narathiwat.  These larger numbers, however, reflect the older generations.  The mean 
years of schooling for those who have attended school, reflecting the current generation 
of Malay-Muslim children, is within one year of that for the entire country.  The national 
average is 7.3 years of school attendance; while in Pattani it is 6.3 years, 6.9 years in 
Yala, and in Narathiwat 5.9 years.91   
Student to teacher and student to classroom ratios in the three provinces are also 
comparable to the rest of Thailand.92  Narathiwat has a total of 136,027 students and 
6030 teachers.  This yields a ratio of twenty-three students per teacher, with twenty-nine 
students per classroom.  Pattani totals 118, 673 students and 5268 teachers, which yields 
twenty-three students per teacher and twenty-nine students per classroom.  Yala has a 
total of 91,774 students and 4117 teachers.  This gives it twenty-two students per teacher 
and twenty-nine students per classroom.93  
 
89 Abuza, 80. 
90 UNDP 2003.  These numbers are current as of 1997.  The higher the number, the better the quality 
of education.   
91 UNDP 2003.  These numbers are current as of 2001. 
92 These figures are exclusive of universities and pondoks. 
93 UNDP 2003.  These numbers are current as of 2000. 
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The year 2004 highlighted continual threats of danger to teachers and students in 
the southernmost provinces.  As a result, the school went though several periods of 
temporary closures as an attempt to protect these students and teachers.  Holiday periods 
were also extended.  The fear created by the continual threat of danger has forced some 
teachers to resign and move elsewhere, with many more threatening the same.  Thus, the 
insurgent violence has had a direct impact on education in the South.  Torching schools 
has certainly had an immediate economic impact.  However, forcing a reduction in school 
days as well as teachers in the area has negative long-term as well as short-term 





For most of the past century, the southern provinces were Bangkok’s dumping 
ground for inept and corrupt government officials.  The central government intentionally 
sent many of these bureaucrats there as a means of punishment.94  These bureaucrats 
certainly did not act in the best interests of the locals whom they were supposed to 
represent.  For one, Bangkok always had its own political agenda for the region that was 
built without a sufficient understanding or regard for the Malay-Muslims.  Additionally, 
Malay-Muslims were woefully missing from this body of bureaucrats.  The majority of 
civil servants in the provinces continue to be non-Muslim-Malay95.  Representation by 
non-Malay-Muslims from outside the local region who were corrupt and inept, and 
enforced an external agenda, was always a source of contention for the region.          
Experiencing decades of this government practice, the Malay-Muslims simply 
avoided these bureaucrats as best they could.  These bureaucrats had proven over time 
that they were not in the region for the interests of the locals.  As such communications 
between the southernmost provinces and the central government simply broke.  It did the 
locals no good to attempt to communicate their needs and fears when closed ears 
continually met them.  This history of broken communications is having its effect in the 
 
94 Hewison, 32. 
95 “The Call of Allah in Southern Thailand,” Human Rights in Thailand Report 12, no. 3 (July 1987-
April 1988): 14. 
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current crisis.  Thaksin sent a succession of envoys to the southernmost provinces in 2004 
to hear the problems of the locals.  Yet these envoys were met with distrust and 
indifference.  The pervading fear in the region is certainly one cause of this local 
reaction.  However, the government’s record of putting forth a facade of concern for the 
locals’ need, when it really did not care, is still felt by the locals.  As will be analyzed in a 
later chapter, Thaksin has added to this during 2004 in sending several representatives to 
the area to listen to the locals and formulate a plan for crisis resolution, and yet failing to 
enact any of the recommendations gathered from this process.        
Given the long held resentment towards the Thai state, combined with higher 
poverty rates and lower general education attainment, one might readily assume the 
political participation of Malay-Muslims in national politics would be low.  Such an 
assumption could not be more blatantly wrong.  The parliamentary elections of 1992 
marked the first time the three southernmost provinces were represented in national 
parliament by all Muslim MPs.  These election results led to greater participation by the 
Malay-Muslims in the political process.96  Recent studies show that the Malay-Muslim 
dominated provinces exhibit an even higher level of political participation than some 
Buddhist-dominated provinces.97  This high level of political participation is 
accompanied by a high level of political attentiveness, meaning both interest in the 
elections and knowledge of issues, candidates, and parties.98  
The recent 2005 parliamentary election supports this research.  Voter turnout in 
the southernmost provinces shows no significant deviation from that of the entire 
kingdom.  75.1 percent of registered voters nationwide voted in the parliamentary 
election.  As a region, 77 percent of registered voters in the South voted.  Individually, 
73.2 percent of eligible voters in Narathiwat, 74.3 percent in Pattani, and 75.9 percent 
cast votes.99    
Likewise, research indicates no significant difference between Buddhists and 
Malay-Muslims in political efficacy, defined as the belief that citizens operating within a 
 
96 For a recent case study on the voting behavior of Malay-Muslims, see Robert B. Albritton, 
“Electoral participation by southern Thai Buddhists and Muslims,” South East Asia Research 4, no. 2 
(September 1996).  
97 Ibid., 130.  
98 Ibid., 128. 
99 The National Election Commission of Thailand, published on The Nation Election Homepage 2005. 
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democratic society are politically effective.100  This suggests Malay-Muslims have not 
abandoned the formal Thai political process as a means to possibly achieving their ends.  
Hope can be drawn from this that a political end to the current violence is still possible. 
Party affiliation in southern Thailand is of particular interest.  The South had long 
been the stronghold of the Democrat Party.101  Research suggests that the Buddhists and 
Thai-speaking Muslims in this region will vote strictly along Democrat Party lines.  The 
Malay-Muslims, however, while generally backing the Democrat Party, will split their 
vote to ensure voting for a Malay-Muslim who they think will best represent their 
interests.  This too was illustrated in the recent 2005 parliamentary election.  The voters 
in Narathiwat elected one of only two MPs in the South who were not Democrat.102  
The fact that, in the South, Thai-speaking Muslims tend to vote more in harmony 
with the Buddhists than the Malay-Muslims is intriguing.  This may suggest that culture, 
with language as defining attribute, is a greater cleavage than religion in the southernmost 
provinces.  This is extremely difficult to determine in the case of the Muslim-Malays 
since ethnic and religious identity are so interwoven.  Academics have long considered 
the two inseparable within the Malay-Muslim community.  Nonetheless, it might be 
argued that a greater affinity towards ethnic identify could explain why more radical 
Islamic ideologies have historically failed to spread throughout this community.     
Thus, it is readily evident when examining the current demographics of Pattani, 
Yala, and Narathiwat that many of the Malay-Muslims’ historical sources of grievance 
still exist.  The area still has a woefully underdeveloped economy, especially in 
comparison to the entire country as well as the northern provinces of Malaysia.  The 
government continues its ongoing administrative assault on the status and traditional role 
of pondoks, pushing the advancement of secular education much to the cost of rather than 
the mutual accompaniment to secular education.  The local bureaucracy remains out of 
tune with the local communities.  The central government continues to suggest through 
its actions that it neither truly cares for the region as it should or that it just does not yet 
 
100 Albritton, 143. 
101 This party is also known as Prachatipat. 
102 This was a Muslim candidate in the Chart Thai Party.  The other non-Democrat MP was elected in 
Phang Nga province, which put a Thai Rak Thai candidate in office.  The author of this thesis assesses this 
deviation in Phang Nga was a result of sound, successful tsunami relief efforts in Phang Nga prior to the 
election by the ruling Thai Rak Thai party.  
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clearly see the true picture.  Many of the grievances felt throughout the last century are 
still present in the twenty-first century because the government keeps committing the 




















                                                
IV. ISLAMIC INSURGENCY IN SOUTHERN THAILAND 
Separatist or autonomist movements, complete with organized groups to advance 
their causes, have existed since the end of World War II.103  Besides that in southernmost 
Thailand, other noted separatist movements in Southeast Asian history include those of 
the Moro in the Philippines, the Acehnese in Indonesia, and the Shan, Karen, and 
Rohinga in Burma.  The key dates in the start of the separatist movement in Thailand are 
26-28 April 1948, the period of the Dusun Nyor Rebellion.104  The first organized group 
striving for separatism was the Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani in 1959.  
Various organizations have been part of this insurgency movement within 
Thailand in the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century.  Each group arose 
around aspiring elite individuals like traditional leaders and students.  Each strove to 
legitimize its own elite status within its community.  This resulted in factional disunity 
and weakness in the movement as a whole.105  Such disunity among groups has been one 
of the fundamental reasons for the movement’s lack of success. 
“The cost of historical ignorance and amnesia on the origins of separatism in the 
South is to prolong and tacitly approve of a poor and subjective study of modern Thai 
political history.”106  The first chapter of this thesis examined the current Pattani problem 
within the historical context of Malay-Muslim relations with the Thai state.  The next 
chapter illumined how these historical grievances are still present in the region’s 
demography today.  This chapter now focuses on the specifics of the insurgent groups 
that formed as a Malay-Muslim response to the Thai state.  Moving from an analysis of 
these groups when they first formed, to include support, objectives, and modes of 
 
103 In this thesis, I use the terms separatist, autonomist, and secessionist interchangeably.  Various 
groups at different times have sought varying degrees of independence: autonomy within the Thai state, 
complete independence from the Thai state but confederation with Malaysia, and a separate state 
independent from all.  Thus, I make free use of all three terms to name these insurgent groups.    
104Thanet Aphornsuvan, “Origins of Malay Muslim ‘Separatism’ in Southern Thailand,” Asia 
Research Institute (ARI) Working Paper Series, no. 32 (October 2004): 10.  This incident serves as an 
excellent example of writers of history having different perspectives.  The Thai state officially refers to this 
incident as the Dusun Nyor Rebbellion, while the Malay-Muslims call it The War of Dusun Nyor. Calling it 
a war gives the incident a context of two distinct states in conflict.  Calling it a rebellion gives it a context 
of a conflict involving a subordinate group within a state against that state.   
105 Ibid., 5. 
106 Ibid, 2. 
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operation, the details of the current violence will then be assessed in an attempt to 
determine the causes of this renewed insurgency. 
 
 
A. EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Though 1948 is accepted as the landmark date for the start of southern Thailand’s 
secessionist movement, the first organized group with a platform of violent rebellion did 
not appear until 1959.  If one decision more than any other by the Thai government can 
be said to have forced the hand of secessionists to organize into violent groups, it was 
Prime Minister Sarit’s attempt to enforce direct state control over the pondoks.  This 
marked the start of the existence of organized secessionist groups. 
The life of this movement appeared to have been short.  Several key decisions 
made by Prime Minister Prem, as well as bilateral cooperation between Malaysia and 
Thailand in the 1980’s, largely eliminated both states’ security concerns of insurgents in 
the border provinces.  By the end of the decade, the Thai government estimated that there 
were only 300-500 Malay-Muslim secessionists left in Thailand.107  Furthermore, in 
1993, the Thai government offered general amnesty to the remaining separatists and 
approximately half of them laid down their arms.  As of the turn of this century, it was 
estimated that the number of secessionists remaining in southern Thailand numbered only 
150-200.108  
Nonetheless, insurgencies do not die easily.  Although traditional secessionist 
groups like Pattani United Liberation Organization and Barison Revolusi Nasional seem 
to have effectively been reduced in the 1980’s and 1990’s, several smaller, more radical 
groups emerged in the 1990’s.109  These include the New Pattani United Liberation 
Organization and the Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani.  The first major arson attack on 
schools in southern Thailand took place in 1993.  This practice, restarted in 2002, was 
widespread throughout 2004.110  After having waned for a period of time, organized 
 
107 Abuza, 78. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 S.P. Harish, “Conflict in Southern Thailand: Removing Education from the Security Agenda,” 
IDSS Commentaries 33, (2004): 1. 
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insurgent groups now seem to be more active than ever.  Thus, the world is witnessing an 
unprecedented level of violence in southernmost Thailand.   
What follows is an examination of the main insurgent groups as they developed.  
It is important to note that the Western literature on the exact details of these groups is 
small and extremely conflicting.  All the primary scholars and analysts on these groups 
disagree with each other in one detail or another, whether it is the founding date, group’s 
objectives, or recent activity.  As such it is extremely difficulty to separate the truths from 
the errors.  These facts are very suggestive for the current conflict.  First, they suggest 
that not enough quality study of these groups has been conducted in the past.  Second, 
they suggest that a large degree of confusion and general lack of understanding and 
awareness by outsiders has accompanied the secessionist insurgency from its historical 
outset.  Having such a shallow, conflicting basis of understanding on the history of these 
groups, it is no wonder that the current picture of which groups are responsible for which 
acts in the most recent violence remains so murky. 
 
 
1. The Barisan Nasional Pemberbasan Pattani (BNPP) 
 
In 1959, a Malay-Muslim named Tengku Abdul Jalal founded this organization, 
also called the Patani National Liberation Front.  It drew its support from the traditional 
elites, both aristocrats and religious.111  Malay-Muslim students in Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan also provided substantial support.112  The objective of the organization was 
neither mere autonomy within the Thai state nor integration of the Pattani region with 
Malaysia.  It sought complete independence from Thailand in order to establish its own 
Islamic state, dar-al-Islam.  To achieve this, BNPP’s strategy centered on armed guerilla 
warfare against Thai security forces.  Its operations were at maximum frequency during 
the 1960’s when it was involved in numerous violence clashes.113  
 
111 Syed Serajul Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of 
the Philippines,” Asian Survey 38, no. 5 (May 1998): 446. 
112 Peter Chalk, “Militant Islamic Separatism in Southern Thailand,” in Islam in Asia: Changing 
Political Realities, ed. Jason F. Isaacson and Colin Rubenstein (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
2002), 182. 
113 Syed Serajul Islam, “The Liberation Movement of the Muslims in Patani Raya of Thailand,” Asian 
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By 1990, the group had changed its objective to conform to the larger global 
struggle launched by separatists around the world.  At that point, it changed its name to 
Barisan Islam Pemberbasan Pattani (BIPP), also called the Pattani Islam Liberation Front.  
Note the new emphasis on Islam in its new name to correspond to the global Islamist 
movement.  By end of the 1990’s, it had ceased all activity in Thailand.  It then restarted 
operations in Thailand in 2002 after attending a meeting of eight Malay-Muslim 
separatist groups conducted in northern Malaysia in the earlier part of that year.  
Headquartered in northern Malaysia, U.S. government analysts believe BNPP again 
started participating in attacks on Thai security forces during 2002.114  Little is currently 
known about the BIPP’s exact relation to the increased violence of 2004.   
 
 
2. The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) 
 
Abdul Karim Hassan, also known as Ustaz Karim, and Mapiyoh Sadala, founded 
this group on 13 March 1960.  The group is also called the National Revolutionary Front.  
Ustaz became the organizational leader and Sadala was the group’s field commander.115  
Ideological differences and conflicts of interest forced the group to later subdivide into 
three factions: the BRN Congress, the BRN Coordinate, and the BRN Ulema.  The BRN 
Congress, originally led by Rosa Burako, is primarily responsible for the group’s 
military-like operations.  The BRN Coordinate focused on political agitation and urban 
sabotage.  Many analysts believed it completely ceased operations by 2000.116  The BRN 
Ulema emphasized political and religious work. It had the strongest following of the three 
among the area’s religious leaders.  Some analysts at the United States Pacific Military 
Command (USPACOM) believe the BRN Congress is the one faction of BRN that has 
remained active into the current violence.117      
 
Profile 28, no. 5 (October 2000): 404. 
114 Virtual Information Center, “Primer: Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand,” (Honolulu: 
USPACOM, 2002), 10. 
115 Andrew D. W. Forbes, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities: Assimilation, Secession, or Coexistence?” 
Asian Survey 22, no. 11 (November 1982): 1063. 
116 Virtual Information Center, 10. 
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49 
                                                
This group, originally having very close ties to the Communist Party of Malaya 
(CMP), was fundamentally opposed to the BNPP in its core ideology.  Whereas the 
BNPP sought an autonomous state independent from Thailand as well as Malaysia, the 
BRN fielded pan-Malay religious-nationalist aspirations.  As such, it desired a state 
independent from Thailand but federated with Malaysia.  BRN had a two-part plan to 
accomplish this.  First, it would force the complete secession of Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat, and resurrect the once great sovereign Malay-Muslim state of Pattani.  
Second, it would then incorporate itself into a greater Malay-Muslim state, governed by a 
single leader, and adhering to socialist principles.   This ideology was centered on three 
core principles: Malay nationalism, anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism, and Islamic 
socialism.118   
Support for this group primarily came from the pondoks.  As such, the group was  
locally based and supported.  Unlike the BNPP, it lacked overseas support.  It also lacked 
the support of the traditional elite.  Additionally, its left-wing socialist ideology failed to 
gain momentum with the mostly conservative leanings of the Malay-Muslim population.  
When the appeal of socialism declined during the latter stages of the Cold War, so too did 
the support for the BRN.  These weaknesses tremendously dampened the effectiveness of 
the organization.119
Even so, because it did have such clearly defined objectives and a strong 
operational status, the group conducted numerous armed attacks on state authorities that 
neither went unnoticed by the media nor the Thai central government.  By 1980, 
individual cells of the BRN had proven their ability to conduct operations throughout 
southern Thailand as well as Bangkok.120  They tended to focus their operations along the 
Thai-Malay frontier in Songkhla and Yala.121  As a result of these operations, the Thai 
government considered the group a serious threat to state security and stability. 
The BRN as a whole became overshadowed by the operations of the Pattani 
United Liberation Organization (PULO) and New PULO.  As previously mentioned, 
 
118 Chalk, 170.  This Islamic socialism emphasized the promotion of a just, prosperous society 
sanctioned by Allah.  
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members of the BRN Congress faction were known to engage in occasional acts of 
violence through 2002.  The group as a whole, however, is believed to have transformed 
into more of a local crime organization.  It mainly engages in fear-extortion practices 
against businesses in southernmost Thailand that it views as exploitive of or contradictory 
to the interests of the Malay-Muslim population.122
This group is an excellent example of one of the fundamental problems with 
sorting out the current violence, which will be discussed in depth shortly.  This problem 
is that of distinguishing secessionist violence from criminal violence from jihadist 
violence, and determining whether people with truly secessionist interests, radical 
Islamist interests, crime syndicate interests, or personal interests, are sponsoring those 
actually committing the violence.  The BRN exemplifies a group in which violent acts are 
committed for both secessionist and criminal reasons. 
 
 
3. The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) 
 
This group, founded on 22 March 1968, is the most known of the separatist 
groups and is often synonymous with Thailand’s secessionist problem. There exists 
disagreement in who the precise founder was.  Analysts at USPACOM published the 
founder as Tuanko Biyo Kodoniyo.123  Many other scholars, including Peter Chalk, 
maintain the founder was Kabir Abdul Rahman, an Islamic scholar who had become 
disillusioned with what he perceived to be ineffectual and limited Malay-Muslim 
opposition towards the Thai state.124  Rahman had previously been a member of 
BNPP.125  Regardless of who founded the organization, PULO gathered support from 
younger, more militant Malay-Muslims.  Many of these had studied overseas and while 
doing so were influenced by radical strains of Islam.   
  PULO advertises its ideology to be based on UBANGTAPEKEMA, an acronym 
incorporating religion, race, nationalism, homeland, and humanitarianism.  The group 
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saw the attainment of this objective as longer-term.  Thus, PULO has supported a 
continually improved education in the southernmost provinces centered on traditional 
religious education.  Additionally, the group has always understood the importance of 
continually nourishing the political consciousness and national aspirations of the local 
Malay-Muslims.   
The group views one of the most important ends to it violence as increased 
international awareness of the Malay-Muslim plight in southern Thailand.  The 
organization has a specific armed wing, called the Pattani United Liberation Army 
(PULA), which carries out its violent actions towards this ends.  Such actions have 
included bombings as well as arson attacks.  During the Cold War, the group was 
believed responsible for the majority of violence against the Thai state.126  This violence 
included occasional bomb attacks in Bangkok.         
PULO has enjoyed substantial international support, particularly from the Middle 
East, as well as from co-religionists in Malaysia.  Syria and Libya were particularly 
strong financial contributors to the organization.127  The Malaysian Islamic opposition 
party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), which is still extremely influential in the northern 
provinces of Malaysia, especially Kelantan, has always been very closely allied to PULO.  
This staunch external support helped legitimize PULO in the greater Muslim world.  
PULO operatives have been able to train overseas in the Middle East and effectively use 
northern Malaysia as a safe haven.128
After the general decline in the number of southern insurgents by 1993, some 
analysts believe PULO enjoyed a surge in recruitment.  As of 2002, PULO was believed 
to have had 350 core members.129  Many attribute the fact that PULO currently has a 
larger, more solid core of members than all the other insurgency groups because of its 
close ties to the larger Islamist movement.  Several have suggested that radical elements 
in northern Malaysia have successfully facilitated the trans-shipment of arms from 
Cambodia that end up in southern Thailand.  Although such an allegation has never been 
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proven, it suggests the possible existence of a larger Southeast Asian insurgent ring also 
involving radicals in Mindanao and Aceh.130   
PULO has in the past demonstrated the ability to coordinate several operations in 
a shorter period of time, similar to some of the better-coordinated attacks in 2004.  For 
example, in 1993, in less than one month, it successfully committed: arson attacks on 
thirty-four schools in the southernmost three provinces, an ambush of a military unit in 
Yala, an attack againt a train in Narathiwat, and a grenade attack on a Buddhist temple, 
also in Narathiwat. 
Thai government officials, as well as United States officials, suspected PULO had 
international links to other state-sponsored terrorist groups throughout much of the 
1990’s.  In 1994, Thai security officials accused PULO as having been part of the 
attempted Iranian-sponsored Hizbollah truck bombing of the Israeli embassy in Bangkok.  
Specifically, intelligence officials claimed PULO aided with the local logistics of the 
operation.  In 1995, Thai police officials reported that PULO was facilitating the entry of 
state-based terrorists into Thailand.  Though there remains a lack of concrete evidence 
linking PULO to non-Southeast Asian extremists, the United States has kept a watch on 
this possibility for some time.131     
Cross-border relations between Thailand and Malaysia in confronting the 
common border security situation took a substantial turn for the better in 1998.  Thai 
security forces arrested several key leaders of PULO.  Most notable was the arrest of 
Hayi Sama-ae Thanam, then leader of PULA.  This crackdown seemingly quieted PULO 
for the next few years. 
As such, many commentators on the current violence in southernmost Thailand 
have dismissed PULO as having an important role in it.  Such a ready dismissal is 
unwise.  Even with important leaders of the movement arrested in 1998, and the group 
having ceased operations for the following few years, several facts cannot be easily 
dismissed.  First, if PULO did have 350 core members in 2002, these members did not 
simply disappear.  Second, PULO was known to have strong support from the Middle 
East.  This support assuredly did not simply disappear.  Third, and perhaps the most 
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important point missed by current analysts, the violence of 2004, with several examples 
of excellent planning and coordination, matches the profile of PULO. 
 
 
4. The New Pattani United Liberation Organization (New PULO) 
 
Arrong Mooreng and Hayi Abdul Rohman established this group in 1995 as a 
dissident faction of PULO.  Its goal is self-autonomy, but achieved through less dramatic 
albeit more consistent means.  As such, it conducted regular small-scale bombings, 
incendiary attacks, and shootings on a regular basis for the three-year period beginning in 
1995.  This violence served to continually harass local administrative and security forces.  
Schools, a symbol of Thai oppression given the government’s historical assimilation 
attempts of the pondoks, were a target of choice for this New PULO.132
The group’s operations were primarily confined to Narathiwat and Yala 
provinces.  Haji Da-oh Thanam led the operational wing, called the Armed Force 
Council.  This wing was further subdivided into three groups: the Maso Dayeh Group, 
responsible for Yala’s Betong district, the Sali Ta-loh Bueyor Group, responsible for 
Narathiwat’s Janae and Sri Sakhon districts, and the Ma-ae Tohpien Group, responsible 
for all remaining districts in Yala and Narathiwat.  Thanam proved to be an effective 
leader.133
Thai security officials reported during this period that New PULO hired young 
drug addicts to conduct the majority of their attacks.  New PULO could hire these youth 
for a relatively low price.  Furthermore, such youth were readily available.  Using youth 
for its attacks allowed New PULO to conserve its own limited human resources.  It also 
makes sense from an organizational internal security perspective; should one of the youth 
be captured, he will have no real knowledge of the group as he is simply a thug-for-
hire.134  
The crackdown in 1998 that silenced PULO also effectively diminished New 
PULO’s operations.  For the next few years the group was not associated with any  
132 Chalk, 174. 
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attacks.  Thai security officials also managed to arrest key leaders of this organization, to 
include Haji Da-oh Thanam, leader of the group’s field operations, and Rohman Bazo, 
the group’s chairman.  As with PULO, however, New PULO should not be so easily 
dismissed in considerations of the current violence.  In particular, the hiring of young 
drug addicts to conduct attacks throughout 2004 certainly fits the profile of New PULO.  
The Tak Bai incident at the end of April 2004 serves as an excellent example of this. 
 
 
5. The Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) 
 
This group, also known as the Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement, first 
appeared in southern Thailand in 1995.  Not as much is definitively known about this 
group.  It is a descendant of the former Mujahideen Pattani Movement (BNP), a very 
small militant front established in 1985.  This is an urban group consisting of several 
former Afghan fighters.135  Joseph Liow suggests the group shares similar separatist 
goals to the earlier groups.136  USPACOM analysts from the Virtual Information Center 
consider the group a bandit outfit that conducts acts of terror in an attempt to impress 
established groups that it too “aspires to become separatists”.137   
It should worry analysts that so little is known about this group.  Anthony Davis 
recently assessed that this group is playing a significant role in the current violence.138  
Thai security officials throughout 2004 mentioned the group often.  Since it was not 
established until later than the other groups, and it started in such a low-key fashion while 
Thai authorities were focusing their efforts on disbanding PULO and New PULO, it is 
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6. The United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bersatu) 
 
This group is also known as the Barisan Kemerdekaan Pattani and Solidarity.  In 
1987, core members of BIPP, BRN, PULO, and NEW PULO conducted a joint meeting, 
called “the gathering of the fighters for Pattani”, to discuss the viability and smartness of 
conducting joint operations, thereby unifying the effort of previously non-associated 
groups.  These individuals agreed to establish the “Payong Organization” and unify its 
efforts in established an Islamic state free from Thai rule.  The name of this organization 
was changed in 1991 to its current one, most commonly referred to as Bersatu.139
Members working these joint attacks against the Thai state followed a particular 
mode of operations.  They deployed in small insurgent bands to conduct guerilla 
activities primarily in the rural areas.  They had no permanent bases, always moving from 
one location to another.  These insurgents avoided armed clashes with Thai security 
forces.  The fighting they conducted was truly guerilla in nature in that it was quick, 
avoiding protracted encounters.  In response to bouts of government suppression, they 
responded with attacks against public facilities.  Attempting to create a schism between 
the Muslim and Buddhist communities in the southernmost provinces was also a common 
operating objective.140   
Bersatu is most known, however, for a joint operation in 1997 called “Falling 
Leaves”.  This operation was an attempt to refocus national as well as international 
attention on the plight of the Malay-Muslims.  The targets of the operation included the 
usual symbols of the Thai state: government administrators, security forces, state 
workers, and teachers.  The mode of violence covered the spectrum of bombs, grenades, 
drive-by shootings, and incendiary attacks.  Between August 1997 and January 1998, the 
campaign included at least thirty-three attacks, which resulted in a total of nine deaths 
and several dozen injured.  This particular operation was the gravest increase in violence 
associated with the separatist movement since the early 1980’s.  This operation led to the 
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coordinated combined crackdown by both Thailand and Malaysia in 1998, seemingly 
silencing the separatist movement.141                    
 
 
B. CURRENT SITUATION 
 
At this point, a brief discussion of the general nature of the current separatist 
insurgency is in order.  More specifically, this insurgency should be examined against the 
growing international phenomenon of terrorism.  Are the Malay-Muslim separatists in 
fact terrorists?  Or are the separatists in fact guerrilla war-fighters?  Does the fact that 
they are or are not terrorists influence any relations they may have with transnational 
terrorist groups?    
In order to address these questions, a few definitions must be established.  
Terrorism can be defined as: 
…an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by 
(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, 
criminal, or political reasons, whereby- in contrast to assassination- the 
direct targets of violence are not the main targets.  The immediate human 
victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) 
or selectively (representative of symbolic targets) from a target population, 
and serve as message generators.  Threat- and violence- based 
communications processes between terrorist (organizations), (imperiled) 
victims, and main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a 
target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether 
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.142
 
A primary focus of this definition is the target of the violent action.  The “direct 
targets of violence are not the main targets”.  Rather, the direct targets of terrorism are 
usually state symbols and political opponents, while the main targets are governments 
and the public at large.143  These targets ordinarily, according to the rules of land warfare, 
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are protected by immunity from deliberate attack.144  In examining the current Malay-
Muslim insurgency, the number of state symbolic or general public targets increased 
throughout 2004 and continues to rise throughout 2005.  While security forces are still 
the preponderance of targets, insurgent violence is certainly not limited to them.  This 
suggests that the separatist insurgency is growing into more of a terrorist movement. 
Paradoxically, even though the insurgency trend is towards terrorism, at heart it 
remains a guerrilla movement.  Scholar David Rapoport defines guerrilla warfare as “a 
special kind of military activity, in which hit-and-disappear tactics to disperse the 
enemy’s military forces were employed to wear down and gradually defeat the 
enemy”.145  In contrast to terrorism, such violence is internationally recognized as legal 
as long as it adheres to the internationally accepted rules of warfare.146  The secessionist 
movement still primarily targets police and military officials using hit-and-disappear 
tactics.  It can be questioned, however, whether the intended impact of such violence is 
the physical attrition of the enemy, which tactically defines guerrilla warfare, of 
psychological coercion, which belongs to the realm of terrorism.147  
Thus, it is difficult to define whether the Malay-Muslim insurgency is a guerrilla 
movement or a terrorist movement.  Given that its primary targets and tactics remain 
those of guerrilla warfare, it can perhaps best be defined as a guerrilla movement, though 
one that is currently, and more frequently, using terrorism as a means of its violent 
political struggle for a sovereign Malay-Muslim state.  The increased terrorist nature of 
this movement could be suggestive of a few possibilities.  The increased number of 
terrorist attacks could signal increased support from terrorist organizations such as 
Jemaah Islamiah.  This could also signify the willingness of separatists to move the 
violence to another level in its attempt at goal attainment.  The increased terrorist attacks 
could also signify an attempt by separatist insurgents to draw the further interest and 
involvement of established terrorist groups towards its cause.  A combination of any of 
these could also be a possibility.  
144 Ibid., 204. 
145 David Rapoport, “The Politics of Atrocity,” in Y. Alexander and S.M. Finger (eds), Terrorism: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: John Jay Press, 1977): 47, quoted in Schmid, 205. 
146 These internationally accepted rules of warfare are codified in the Hague Regulations and the 
Geneva Conventions.  At the heart of these is the protection of noncombatants and innocents. 
147 Schmid, 206. 
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An increase in terrorist targets and tactics by separatist insurgents would 
definitely demonstrate to established terrorist groups the willingness to receive their aid.  
Likewise, transnational terrorist groups are more than willing to globally expand 
wherever they can.  Thus, if the increased terrorist nature of the growing separatist 
violence does not already signal the entry of established transnational terrorist groups, it 
certainly increases the possibility thereof.  This is even more reason that the current 
insurgency must be resolved before it increases even further.       
Many analysts had assessed that as of 1999, the insurgency movement had finally 
been defeated.  The few years of silence from southern Thailand seemed to support this 
assessment.  Then, in April 2001, separatists bombed the Hat Yai train station in 
Songkhla province and a Yala hotel.  Sporadic violence continued throughout the rest of 
the year.  Starting 24 December 2001, which interestingly is Christmas Eve in the 
Christian world, insurgents began a sustained campaign against security forces.  Within 
the first seven months, nineteen policemen were killed and another seven seriously 
injured.  Three civilians were also killed, with another three wounded.  Insurgents seized 
fifty-four rifles, numerous shotguns and handguns, and approximately 4000 rounds of 
ammunition from these attacks.148  By the summer of 2002, analysts could safely say that 
southernmost Thailand’s insurgency issue had once again emerged.  Not only had it again 
emerged, but by the end of 2004, it had reached an unprecedented level. 
Examining more closely the first seven months of this new campaign of violence, 
the one pattern that stands out is that police forces were the targets.  Civilian casualties 
were largely the result of collateral damage rather than having specifically been targeted.  
All of the attacks on the police forces occurred either while they were at their police 
boxes or main stations.  Additionally, shootings were the method of attack in all cases but 
two: on 12 March 2002 grenades were thrown at a target, and on 6 May 2002 rocket-
propelled grenades were used.  Thus, these attacks demonstrated a consistency in targets.  
Such consistency suggests that these violent acts were not merely random, but rather 
planned.  
Targets and attack methods then expanded in July 2002.  On 2 July, a police 
senior sergeant major was ambushed while returning home.  Insurgents used bomb-
 
148 Virtual Information Center, 21. 
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strapped motorcycles in attacking two district offices on 3 July.  On 8 July, bombs were 
detonated on a train car in Yala.  Then on 10 July, insurgents attacked a policeman in 
Narathiwat while he was guarding schoolteachers.  Thus, after a half year of strictly 
targeting policemen in their offices or boxes, primarily with rifle and small arms fire, the 
insurgency widened to include mobile police ambushes and increased bombings.  
Throughout the rest of the 2002 and 2003, the insurgency continued to expand its target 
list as well as means and method of attack.  By 2004, targets included policemen, 
soldiers, government officials, village headsmen, state workers, local laborers, monks, 
teachers, and school children.  Means of attack included shootings, stabbings, slashings, 
grenades, bombs, and incendiary.  Methods of attack included raids, ambushes, pre-
planted bombings, and direct confrontation.  The insurgency in 2004 reached a previously 
unknown level in all regards: frequency of attacks, severity, target choice, means, and 
methods.   
The ruling Thaksin government refused to admit that this renewed insurgency was 
directly related to the region’s historical secessionist movement until 2004.  On 21 July 
2002, after the Thai government realized that the South’s insurgency had indeed been 
renewed, Minister Wan Muhamad Nor Matha emphasized conflicts of interests among 
local authorities as a main cause of the violence.149  This came only one day after Prime 
Minister Thaksin publicly declared that drugs were the primary cause of the violence.150  
Thaksin then continued throughout 2003 blaming the violence on local bandits.  This 
early example of ranking government officials contradicting one another and attributing 
blame for the violence to a whole slew of causes continued throughout 2004.  The fact 
that government officials have continually contradicted one another’s story, and laid 
blame to various causes, suggests the Thai government has not had a clear grasp of the 
situation.  
As earlier stated, the insurgency in southernmost Thailand exploded in 2004.  On 
4 January, upwards of one hundred armed insurgents raided the Thai Army depot in 
Narathiwat.  They seized well over 300 weapons in the raid, including assault rifles, 
pistols, machine guns, and ammunition.  Four soldiers were killed in the attack.  The Thai 
 
149 Bangkok Post, 22 July 2002. 
150 Bangkok Post, 21 July 2002. 
government suspected the insurgents had inside help in the planning and conduct of this 
raid, but nothing has been proven.151  Additionally, no individual or group claimed 
responsibility for the attack.  Immediately following the raid, eighteen schools were 
simultaneously torched around the province.  Thai authorities believe the primary 
purpose for these particular school burnings was to provide a distraction to aid the 
insurgents’ getaway from the army depot.152  As a response to this attack, the Thai 
government placed the three southernmost provinces under martial law. 
 
 
Figure 6. Southern Thai Districts Under Martial Law in 2004 153
 
This particular attack, which harbingered the elevated level of insurgency activity 
in 2004, is telling in several regards.  First, the attack demonstrated a high degree of 
planning and coordination that hadn’t been seen in years.  Rogues simply did not decide 
last minute to raid an army installation.  The insurgents knew that at that time there was 
minimum manning at the camp, they knew the best way to ingress and egress the 
installation, and they knew where the arms were stored once they were inside.  
Additionally, they had transportation waiting for not only their escape, but to transport 
the large number of stolen arms.  They then conducted simultaneous diversionary arson 
attacks to aid their escape.  Second, the attack had to be conducted by a larger number of 
individuals to account for all those who raided the camp as well as those who torched the 
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schools.  Though many may reasonably have been insurgents for hire, at least a core 
group of those that led the camp raid had to be trained, core insurgents.  Third, no group 
or individual claimed the raid.  It was common for insurgent groups during the last 
several decades to claim responsibility for their attacks.  This could signify purposeful 
intent on the part of the insurgents to confuse security officials.       
 The unprecedented frequency and severity of attacks during 2004, resulting in 
over 600 deaths and nearly as many injuries, targeted a variety of individuals, from 
security forces to rubber plantation workers.  Perhaps the most disturbing attacks for the 
local Buddhist community, however, occurred on 24 January 2004 when three monks 
were killed, including a thirteen-year old novice, with one monk decapitated.  With the 
intensity of these attacks, the government’s lack of control over the situation, and the 
imposition of martial law, fear throughout the southernmost provinces also elevated to a 
previously unknown level.154
This pervading fear is a particularly troubling problem of the current insurgency.  
Fear has bred uncertainty, and uncertainty has caused complete distrust.  Though the 
Buddhists and the Malay-Muslims living together there have never socialized that much, 
they at least trusted one another.  Now the Buddhists and the Malay-Muslims do not trust 
each other.  Additionally, with the imposition of martial law, the Malay-Muslims do not 
trust the security forces, and the security forces do not trust the Malay-Muslims.155  The 
uncertainty of not knowing who exactly is behind these insurgent attacks, as well as not 
knowing who, what, or where the next target will be, has tremendously impacted 
community relations.   
Heavy-handedness by security forces has further enflamed the situation and added 
to the general atmosphere of mistrust.  Two incidents in particular illustrate this.  On 28 
April, security forces clashed with over a hundred militants throughout Pattani, Yala, and 
 
154 I readily perceived this fear throughout the inhabitants of Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala during the 
two weeks of August and September 2004 that I spent in the region.  Interviews with locals, as well as with 
Dr.  
Wattana Sugunnasil at Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani, confirmed how widespread and deep 
this fear was.   
155 A distrust of security forces, particularly police, has long existed among the Malay-Muslims.  The 
fact that these troops are a symbol of what the Malay-Muslims consider a repressive state largely accounts 
for this historical distrust.  Additionally, a long, documented history of extra-judicial abductions and 
killings by local policemen already existed.   
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Narathiwat.  The majority of these militants were teenagers, most of whom were armed 
with little more than machetes.  In all, security forces killed 107 insurgents, while losing 
five of their own.  This incident accounted for the largest single-day death toll caused by 
internal conflict in Thailand’s modern history.156  The heart of this day’s tragedy 
occurred at Krue Se mosque in Pattani, an extremely historically significant mosque for 
the Malay-Muslim community.  Thirty-two insurgents took refuge in this mosque after 
having attacked a nearby police post.  Security forces surrounded the mosque and ordered 
the insurgents to come out of the mosque and surrender.  When they did not, a group of 
commandoes attempted to penetrate the mosque, at which time one was killed.  Security 
forces then changed tactics and leveled the mosque with vehicle-mounted, automatic 
machine-gun fire.157  Ranking officer on scene General Pallop Pinmanee, Deputy 
Director of Internal Security Operation Command, apparently against the instructions of 
Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit, ordered the assault.  Commenting on the day’s events, 
Prime Minister Thaksin praised the actions of security forces, suggesting that the youth 
who were killed were worthless drug addicts.158        
It is true that these militants had initiated the day’s attacks.  However, confronting 
machete-wielding youth with automatic gunfire seemed excessive to the local Malay-
Muslim community.  The Malay-Muslim community had already lost their trust in 
security forces.  With this latest excessive use of force by security personnel, mostly 
police units, what little trust had been remaining was completely destroyed.  Deputy 
Prime Minister Chavalit did remove General Pallop from duty in the South the next day 
and reassigned him to Bangkok for disobedience.  Yet, at the same time, Chavalit praised 
Pallop’s actions, calling him “Thailand’s General McArthur”.159  
The second incident occurred on 25 October 2004.  That day, over 2000 Malay-
Muslims, primarily teenagers and young adults, amassed outside the police station at Tak 
 
156 The Nation, 29 April 2004.  Thailand’s next largest single-day death toll was seventy-two on 14 
October 1973 when security forces clashed with largely student demonstrators on and around Rajadamnoen 
Avenue in Bangkok. 
157 I visited this mosque in summer 2004 shortly after reconstruction began.  The mosque truly was 
completely leveled.  In interviewing locals, they confirmed that security forces also fired M-79 rounds and 
rocket-propelled grenades. 
158 Bangkok Post, 29 April 2004. 
159 The Nation, 29 April 2004. 
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Bai in Narathiwat to demand the release of six suspects detained on charges of stealing 
arms from community defense forces.  By mid-afternoon, police forces dispersed the 
crowd with water cannons and tear gas.  Over 300 protestors were arrested.  Nine 
demonstrators were killed in the clash.  The arrested protestors were allegedly 
horizontally stacked in the back of army trucks and, after waiting in the trucks for six 
hours, driven a few hours more to Pattani for processing.  Upon arrival and removal of 
the prisoners in Pattani, seventy-eight had suffocated-to-death, and one more died shortly 
thereafter.160  This incident marked the second highest single-day death toll from internal 
strife in Thailand’s modern history, second only to the 28 April 2004 incident.  Prime 
Minister Thaksin immediately praised his security forces.  Commenting on the 
suffocations, he suggested the cause of death could be attributed to Ramadan, which 
Muslims were then observing, since the detainees had apparently already been in a 
weakened physical state from fasting.161  
Once again, the Malay-Muslims perceived Thai security forces as brutal, heavy-
handed agents of a repressive state.  Excessive force and lack of concern for the Malay-
Muslim detainees resulted in scores of unnecessary deaths.  Once again, the central 
government praised the actions of its security forces.  Furthermore, this time instead of 
blaming drugs, Thaksin associated blame with a major Muslim holiday.  While the locals 
saw this physical incident as an attack against the people, they viewed Thaksin’s words 
as a direct assault against Islam.  By this time, all trust of Thai authority in the 
southernmost provinces was completely shattered.  The Malay-Muslim community was 
outraged.  It could easily have used Thaksin’s words, especially when calculating into the 
equation the pattern of brutality against the locals, as justification for a jihad against the 
Thai state.162  
In addition to these major incidents of perceived excessive force and brutality, 
claims of extra-judicial kidnappings and killings were rampant throughout 2004.  On 18 
March, Minister of Parliament Tharin Jaisamut of Satun claimed over a hundred residents 
 
160 Bangkok Post, 27 October 2004. 
161 Ibid. 
162 To this date, I am unaware of any reporting that indicates the locals have called for a jihad against 
the Thai state.  Nonetheless, Muslims elsewhere, albeit in more radical communities, have used less in 
justifying the call to jihad.  The main point here is that Thaksin’s words strengthened a religious 
justification for the ongoing insurgency.  
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of the three southernmost provinces had disappeared over the previous few preceding 
months.163  Ahmad Somboon Bualuang, an academic at Prince of Songkhla University in 
Pattani, confirmed the spate of illegal abductions in talks with civic groups on 24 
March.164  Though illegal abductions are difficult to track and tally, many analysts 
suggest that several hundred locals were missing by the end of 2004. 
The abduction and murder of well-known Muslim defense attorney Somchai 
Neelahphaijit, chairman of the Muslim Lawyers Association, brought the reality of these 
abductions to the forefront of media attention.  First reported missing from Bangkok on 
12 March, after media scrutiny finally forced Bangkok police officials to launch a 
rigorous investigation, the lawyer was later discovered murdered.  Rogue policemen, 
apparently upset that Somchai was defending Muslim insurgents in the South, were found 
guilty of ambushing and killing him.  Before his abduction, Somchai had publicly 
accused police officials of brutalizing five suspects arrested in relation to the 4 January 
army post raid.  His allegations included mock hangings, severe beatings, urination in the 
mouth, defecation on the face, and electric shock to the genitals.  After examining the 
bodies of these detainees, Dr. Pradit Chroenthaithavee of the National Human Rights 
Commission confirmed that these individuals had indeed been subjected to beatings and 
genital electric shock.   
In a situation in which there is a high level of violence, fear, and lost trust by all 
parties, the possibility that individuals will attempt to take the law into their own hands is 
a realistic possibility.  It appears this may be the case in the ongoing southern unrest.  
Undisclosed sources in Thailand’s Department of Defense suggest several members of 
the security forces operating in southern Thailand, frustrated with the growing 
insurgency, have donned civilian clothing when off-duty and committed unauthorized 
abductions of Malay-Muslims suspected involved in the insurgent activities.165  If this is 
true, suggesting Thailand’s security apparatus does not have full control of its forces, 
 
163 The Nation, 20 March 2004. 
164 The Nation, 25 March 2004. 
165The author obtained such information from various interviews with higher-ranking Thai security 
officials, including in-country interviews during a November 2004 research trip to Thailand.  To protect 
these sources, their names and all further details will remain undisclosed.   
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then a new and extremely frightening dimension has been added to the existing violent 
situation.  The situation in the South could be on the brink of complete anarchy.  
Bounties have also had a role in the current insurgency.  On 21 November 2004, 
PULO placed bounties, ranging from $600 to $2300, on the governors, deputy governors, 
police captains, all police with ranks of major or higher, and district chiefs of the five 
southernmost provinces.  This followed shortly after the Thai government posted its own 
bounties, ranging from $12,600 to $126,550, on forty-six Malay-Muslims linked to 
insurgent activities.166  To date, money has not been a successful motivating factor in the 
capture of wanted insurgents. 
If the intensity of violence during 2004 was not bad enough, it has worsened thus 
far in 2005.  Compared to the first part of 2004, in which there were a total of thirty-six 
bombings167 and many more shootings and stabbings, the rate of insurgent attacks has 
dramatically risen.  Several attacks now occur practically every day.  29 December 2004 
seems the day the level of insurgency increased yet another notch.  Insurgents attempted 
five assassinations on that day alone: a policeman shot and killed in Narathiwat, a teacher 
shot and wounded in Narathiwat, a news agent shot and killed, a civil defense volunteer 
shot and wounded in Pattani, and a retired teacher slashed and wounded in Pattani.  That 
same day, insurgents conducted coordinated small-arms raids on several police posts 
throughout Narathiwat.  Insurgents also ambushed an armored car in Narathiwat.168  This 
is an example of a typical day now in southernmost Thailand.   
In response to the elevated level of insurgency, the Thai government continues 
sending more security forces into the region.  The number of military forces alone in the 
three southernmost provinces now number approximately 20,000.  This equates to 
eighteen full battalions of troops.  The government also plans to establish a new infantry 
division comprising an additional 12,000 troops.  In addition to military forces, Bangkok 
has also reinforced the police force, which now totals over 10,000.169  This saturation of 
security forces, which totals over 42,000, means that more than two in every one hundred 
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people in the southern three provinces are security personnel.  This is a significant 
number of security forces, yet throwing more security forces has failed to restore peace 
and order.  Instead, the insurgency has grown. 
In addition to the general number of and intensity in attacks, several recent attacks 
suggest an increase in sophistication of tactics used.  An elevated usage of improvised 
explosive devices triggered by mobile phones has been coupled with small arms fire on 
the target.  An example of such tactics occurred on 10 February 2005.  An improvised 
explosive device stopped an army vehicle, after which a firefight with insurgents ensued.  
Later that day, an explosion overturned a police vehicle and waiting insurgents fired upon 
the policemen.170  Whether these insurgents devised such tactics themselves, or external 
forces have provided them with the training, is one of the most important questions this 
new tactic raises. 
The current security situation in the South is as chaotic as ever.  Violence 
continues to increase.  The Thai government continues to lack a clear understanding of 
who exactly is at the root of the current crisis.  Elements of the current violence match the 
profiles of several past separatist groups.  Youth have primarily been used to conduct the 
attacks.  This could suggest widespread support from within the pondoks, from which the 
BRN traditionally drew its support.  Of course Thai officials have claimed the majority of 
these youth are drug addicts.  New PULO was known to have widely used drug addicts to 
conduct its attacks in order to conserve manpower.  The level of coordination of several 
of the 2004 attacks had previously been a key trait of PULO.  PULO is also estimated to 
have had over 300 core members still as of 2002.  If these members had not been part of 
the original resurgence of violence in 2002 and 2003, then the increased strength of the 
insurgency in 2004 would certainly have served as an invitation for them to once again 
get involved.  GMIP largely escaped the 1998 government purge of separatists.  This 
certainly would have placed them in a prime position to lead the new insurgency starting 
in 2001.  Bersatu had been formed to unify efforts and increase efficiency.  The current 
level of violence certainly is indicative of a more unified, efficient effort.  It should also 
not be forgotten that Thai government officials suspected in 2002 that BIPP was once 
again active.  Thus, the current indicators can be read as pointing to any of the past 
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separatist groups.  Thai intelligence believes that GMIP and BRN-Coordinate are two of 
the primary groups involved in the current insurgency.  The greatest probability is that 
several of the past separatist groups are somehow involved.  It is Thai intelligence’s 
responsibility to sort out just who is related how.  So far, they have largely failed at this 
task.171                
One aspect of the situation that adds even greater confusion is that there may be 
one or more entities somehow involved in this violence.  At various times, government 
officials have blamed various entities for the renewed violence.  The fact is that 
historically, all these entities have had a role in southern Thailand.  For various reasons, 
the region has long been considered a haven for criminal activity, to include drug 
movement and arms trade.  Feuding local politicians, as suggested by government 
officials in 2002, have also historically caused turmoil for their own political gains.  
Furthermore, the long-lasting rivalry between police and military officials has always 
particularly displayed itself in the South.  Thus, not only does Thai intelligence need to 
sort out the players among the separatist groups, but also between other groups that have 
traditionally caused trouble.  Though it seems that separatist groups are most responsible 
for the preponderance of violence, these other entities probably have a role in the crisis as 
well.  To all this must be added the possible involvement of outside terrorist groups and 
newly formed groups operating in the South.      
What is for certain is that the insurgency that was thought to be dead in 1999 is 
now very alive and well.  Most analysts are now assessing there will be no near-term end 
to the violence, with the insurgency lasting another three years.172  Even this assessment 
might be too optimistic as the Thai government seems a long ways away from having a 
handle on the situation.  Once again, as suggested in the introduction, there are several 
possibilities for the future of this insurgency.  The South could easily become fertile 
ground for the global jihadist movement.  The current situation is ripe for an increase in 
radical Islamist influence.  The violence could boil over into a civil war.  Likewise, the 
insurgency could keep increasing until it hits a point of irreparable damage with the Thai 
 
171 As will be discussed next chapter, Thaksin is largely to blame for Thai intelligence officials losing 
a clear picture on the southern provinces. 
172 Davis, 1. 
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state, if that point has not already been reached.  One way or another, the future for 
bringing this insurgency under control is not the least bit bright.                            
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V. REASONS FOR CURRENT PROBLEM 
 
This thesis now arrives at a more in-depth examination of the causes of 
Thailand’s Pattani problem.  It began with a historical study of the relationship between 
Malay-Muslims and the Thai state.  This study sheds light on the fact that the original 
source of tensions was political.173  Attempts at assimilating the Malay-Muslim culture, 
particularly during Phibun’s rule before and after the Second World War, have resulted in 
deep resentment.  A survey of the area’s current demographics portrays an economically 
impoverished region, still largely tied to the pondoks for education, which strives to 
maintain its cultural-religious uniqueness.  An exploration of armed insurgency illustrates 
the founding of several separatist groups that, though having different specific objectives 
and means of achieving those objectives, ultimately strove for a breakaway from the Thai 
state.  With one exception, Bersatu, their lack of unity in effort contributed to their lack 
of success.  By 1999, analysts and scholars alike largely believed Thailand’s Pattani 
problem was effectively eliminated.  Now, however, southern Thailand’s armed 
insurgency has reemerged with unprecedented vigor.  The government still has an unclear 
picture of which entities have what exact role in this latest violence.174
Having laid this groundwork, an equation of the underlying causes to the current 
outbreak is in order.  This equation is that a three-fold causal mechanism has ignited the 
Pattani problem anew.  The first is historical grievances.  The Thai government has failed 
to solve many of them.175  As such, they have continued to fester over time.176  This is 
consistent with the theoretical argument that insurgencies grow out of structural causes.  
In the case of Thailand’s current insurgency, these structural causes include relative 
economic deprivation, lack of political participation, and ethnic identity maintenance.  
These structural causes causal factors have not only historically been present, but persist 
today.        
 
173 Islam, Islamic Independence Movements, 452. 
174 Evidence of this is not only the increased insurgent activity, but also the continued admission by 
the administration that it still lacks a clear picture.  Prime Minister Thaksin said it best himself when he 
publicly stated: “I’m dazed and confused.” The Nation, 2 April 2004.  
175 Croissant (forthcoming). 
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This allows fertile ground for the continued reemergence of insurgency should 
some factor serve as a catalyst.  In Thailand’s case, two such catalysts emerged in 2001.  
The first, an internal spark, is the reign of Prime Minister Thaksin who was elected in 
2001.  Thaksin’s administration soon made many policy decisions that opened the door 
afresh to insurgency.  Once the insurgency had restarted, it has continually compounded 
the problem with poor conflict management.177  As noted in the introduction, suppression 
is a common reflexive response by governments towards insurgencies.  The Thaksin 
administration is certainly an example of this.  The government’s clampdown on pondoks 
serves as an example of further structural suppression.  The declaration of martial law 
and the continued increase in total security forces illustrates military suppression of the 
insurgency.  The Thai government has increased its use of force as it has perceived the 
insurgency to worsen, and as a result the insurgency violence has increased.  The 
imprecision of the Thai use of force has also resulted in an increase in violence.  
Examples of the Thai’s imprecise use of violence include regular intrusions into the 
pondoks, perceived random arrests and extrajudicial acts, the Krue Se incident, and the 
Tak Bai incident. 
  Concurrently, a second catalyst, an external spark, further ignited the insurgency.  
This was the international Islamist movement.  After the 9/11 attack in 2001, there was 
an international swelling of courage and belief in success among Muslims worldwide, 
especially those fighting for autonomy.178  More radical variants of Islam had crept into 
Thailand over the previous couple decades.179  The successful 9/11 attacks, inspiring 
Thailand’s separatists to once again take up the cause of independence, gave a voice to 
these more radical elements in southern Thailand as well.  Additionally, as noted in 
insurgent theory, frustrated people often turn to outsiders for help.  The exact working 
relationship between Thailand’s traditional separatists, the more radical Islamic elements, 
regional terrorist groups like Jemaah Islamiah, and the extreme transnational terrorist 
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group Al Qaeda, remains largely unknown.180  However, theory suggests the likelihood 
of some degree of external participation in the insurgency.  As a significant step towards 
resolving this current crisis, Thai intelligence must establish the exact relationship 
between all involved parties.   
 
 
A. HISTORICAL FACTORS 
 
Several historical factors continue to loom large in Thailand’s current crisis.  
These factors cover the spectrum of economics, politics, education, and culture.  This 
thesis has already examined the historical origins of these factors as well as their 
continued existence.  This section briefly further explains why these factors are indeed a 
cause to the Pattani problem.   
No single historical factor alone, whether economic underdevelopment, political 
neglect, or attempted cultural assimilation, is by itself a cause of the current insurgency.  
However, the cumulative effect of all these factors is indeed a cause.  This cumulative 
effect is an environment in which the people feel wholly suppressed, denied who they 
are, and denied what they once had and want to again be.  Placed in a context where 
nearby there is an environment they more closely identify with, that being Malaysia, and 
a larger international environment that calls them to challenge their current conditions, 
that being the larger Islamist movement, and gives them the hope that by continually 
fighting they will achieve their goal of autonomy, that being the jihadist movement, it is 
no wonder that insurgency has ensued.   
As such, it was a grave mistake to think in 1999 that the separatist insurgency had 
disappeared.181  None of these core historical grievances had been resolved, and thus 
there was no real basis for such as assessment.  Just because there was a period of time 
with little violence does not mean the insurgency had disappeared.  Insurgencies, as all 
movements, proceed through periods of increased as well as periods of decreased 
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momentum.182  Factor in a current political atmosphere that gives renewed rise to this 
environment and Thailand’s rekindled Pattani problem was inevitable. 
The former kingdom of Pattani, though once considered great in wealth and 
prosperity, was a conquered nation.  The Thai government, long demanding tribute from 
Pattani, officially incorporated it into the Thai state in 1909.  In so doing, the government 
often used a forced assimilation strategy in its attempt to incorporate this ethnic-religious 
minority into the larger Tai-Buddhist population.  Such a strategy would have, at least in 
the perception of the Malay-Muslims, weakened if not altogether destroyed the unique 
ethnic-religious identity of this populace.  The Malay-Muslims have a strong 
consciousness of their ethnic-religious identity, as well as pride therein, and refuse to 
allow this to disappear. 
Economic underdevelopment persists in the Pattani region.183  The Malay-
Muslims see their fellow Malays enjoying better economic conditions.  They see other 
areas of Thailand as more developed than their region.  Furthermore, their collective 
memory recalls the former days of their economic glory.  They yearn for better, can 
visibly see that something better exists elsewhere around them, and are motivated to 
break away and gain that better economic situation themselves. 
Politically, they feel they have always been perceived as “other” by the state, and 
they see themselves as other.  Being viewed as other by the state equates to being 
considered inferior by the state.  As such, the state dismisses their importance to the state, 
resulting in political neglect as well as economic neglect.  This perception by the Thai 
Muslims causes them to solidify their own political identity independent of the Thai 
state.184
Until these historical factors are eliminated, the chance for continued or renewed 
insurgency always exists.  A catalyst must have something to which it can provide a 
spark.  In this case, that something is the sum of these historical factors.  Take this away 
and regardless of the spark, there will be nothing to catch fire.  The Thai state has failed 
to eliminate these historical factors, and thus allowed two sparks to ignite the insurgency.  
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The current government under Thai Rak Thai leader Thaksin Shinawatra continues to be 
an internal spark.  The 9/11 attack, as a climactic moment in the Islamist as well as 
jihadist movements, provided an internal catalyst.  These are now examined.  
 
 
B. THAKSIN ADMINISTRATION FAILURE 
 
Early in Thaksin’s first term, he introduced one of his initial projects for the 
South.  He called it his “Governors as CEOs Program” and enacted it in six southern 
provinces, including the southernmost ones.  This gave the provincial governors and their 
staffs the power to act more independently of central bureaucracy and manage their 
provinces as individual business companies.  This independence from most central 
control included eliminating much of the traditional oversight from the Ministry of the 
Interior.  The lack of Interior Ministry oversight demanded of this new program was one 
of the main reasons Thaksin decided in April 2002 to eliminate the Southern Border 
Provincial Administration Center (SBPAC) that had previously been established by 
Prime Minister Prem and placed under the control of the Interior Ministry.185  Thaksin 
also decided to remove responsibility for security in the South from the military and give 
it entirely to the Thai police.  This eliminated the Civilian Police Military Task Force 43, 
under the control of The Internal Suppression Operations Command Headquarters in 
Yala.  Such decisions represent a failure to comprehend the region’s unique culture and 
religion.186   
The Southern Border Provincial Administration Center had been assigned overall 
responsibility for the five southern provinces with substantial Islamic populations: 
Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun, and Songkhla.  It was placed above the level of 
provincial governors so it could have oversight of them as well.  Prem established this 
center to provide coordination and support to Thailand’s counterinsurgency efforts in the 
1980’s.187  It proved itself extremely effective against the separatist insurgency as well as 
the communist insurgency.  It also succeeded in reducing the criminal activity in the 
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region.  This organization was the first centrally established government organization that 
was effective in countering the Pattani problem.  It was equally working as well when it 
was disbanded in 2002 as when it was originally founded.188
This administrative body succeeded for several reasons.  For one, it was 
established at a level above the provincial government officials.  Thus, it was able to hold 
these administrators accountable for their actions.  Second, it was headquartered in the 
actual region it was serving.  This gave the locals ready access to it.  The Malay-Muslims 
actually had somewhere they could go to express their grievances.  Third, the center 
really did listen to the complaints of the locals.189  Whether they voiced concerns of 
corruption, ineptness of certain officials, or local conditions, the center did what it could 
to rectify the situation.  For example, if the center investigated complaints of corruption 
concerning a government or military official, and proved the allegations true, it had the 
authority, which it often used, to transfer that official within twenty-four hours.190  
Fourth, the center was additionally able to do this because the Interior Minister, under the 
oversight of the Prime Minister, ensured that only capable officials were assigned to this 
organization.  These officials represented several agencies throughout the government 
and Defense Ministry.  Prem understood what a problem the insurgency was, and 
assigned the best he had to address the situation.  Finally, the center was well connected 
with the area’s intelligence architecture.  It had good relations with the intelligence 
agencies operating in the South and they exchanged valuable information between one 
another.  This also aided the center in making the best decisions possible.191
The Civilian Police Military Task Force 43 was the one interagency task force, 
previously established to directly confront Thailand’s insurgency problem in the 1970’s 
and 1980’s, that was still functioning when Thaksin took office in 2001.  This entity had 
also highly proven itself in effectively countering the separatist movement as well as 
communist movement.  It brought together the Border Patrol Police, Thahaan Phran 
civilian mercenaries, also called Rangers, and the Thai military.  Unifying these 
organizations allowed the task force to develop a fairly robust intelligence picture in the 
 
188 The Nation, 10 January 2004. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Virtual Information Center, 16. 
191 Virtual Information Center, 15-16. 
75 
                                                
South.  As such, it succeeded in tracking the various secessionist group and generally 
knew which terrorist group was responsible for a given act of violence, as well as how 
criminal activities were related.  Not only was the task force effective in its intelligence 
network, but it also succeeded in ensuring the unified focus and cooperation of all the 
various players in southern Thailand’s security apparatus.192   
The Malay-Muslims knew this military-led task force as a, for the most part, fair 
and respecting organization.  Much of this was as a result of the Thai Army.193  The 
Malay-Muslims traditionally harbored much greater disrespect for the police forces than 
they did military forces.194  The Thai police have a long history of brutality and neglect 
towards the Malay-Muslims.  The task force thus served not only as a unifying force for 
the various security forces in the region and an intelligence apparatus, but also helped to 
improve community relations as well.  Thus, Task Force 43 and the Southern Border 
Provincial Administration Center had proven itself effective in improving Malay-Muslim 
relations with the government and providing a crucial intelligence picture of insurgent as 
well as criminal groups. 
Little more than a year after taking office, Thaksin eliminated these proven 
organizations in one fell swoop in April 2002.  He evidently wrongly believed that either 
he could do better or that the agencies were no longer needed.  Believing that the Thai 
Police could oversee the South better than the Thai Army could not have been more 
wrong.  As a result, new insurgent activity developed unknown to the Thai state and went 
unchecked.  The government had lost its eyes and ears in the South.  It also significantly 
dampened local community relations with the state.  These fateful policy decisions  
192 Virtual Information Center, 16. 
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almost three years ago have now set back the government’s ability to counter the current 
insurgency by many more years.195  Thaksin, in completely abandoning what had worked 
and was still necessary, proved that he had not learned the lessons of history.   
The administration continued to compound these original poor decisions with 
further bad judgment.  As such, it has completely mismanaged the growing crisis.  This 
can first be seen in its failure throughout 2002 and 2003 to admit to the problem.  More 
than fifty government officials were killed in the South in the couple years prior to 2004, 
yet it insisted criminal gangs were to blame.  It was not until 2004 that the administration 
publicly confessed that Thailand was again confronting separatist activity.  Its failure to 
see the insurgency for what it is caused a delay in confronting the problem.  When 
Thaksin’s administration did finally confront the problem, it once again demonstrated 
lack of understanding and continues to manage the situation poorly. 
An examination of the early part of 2004, following the 4 January raid on the 
Narathiwat depot, illustrates this point.  Immediately following the incident, Thaksin 
publicly declared the attack as an act of common bandits.  He then continued to express 
his anger with the lack of intelligence coordination between the police and army that 
failed to prevent this attack before it occurred.196  This problem in intelligence, however, 
can directly be tied to his 2002 decisions.  The next day, after shifting blame for the 
attack from bandits to separatists, he deployed 3000 army troops and declared martial law 
in the southernmost provinces.  Thus, he immediately overreacted to the raid.  In deciding 
to use a large-scale military force deployment to confront the situation, he failed to heed 
the lessons of the Thai Army and Prime Minister Prem in the 1980’s.  It had already been 
well demonstrated decades ago that confronting a separatist insurgency with military 
force was not the answer.  Evidently his cabinet also falsely believed that the military was 
the answer, for less than a week after the imposition of martial law, Deputy Prime 
Minister Chavalit claimed the security situation was fully under control.197  Four days 
later, he admitted that much of the Malay-Muslim resentment that still existed was the 
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result of past decades of heavy-handed actions by security personnel.198 Yet the 
government should have realized that the imposition of martial law would create the 
opportunity for an increase on heavy-handedness and thus the furthering of existing 
resentment. 
On 21 January 2004, Thaksin’s administration renewed attacks against southern 
Thailand’s pondoks.  It declared a government ban against the opening of any new 
pondoks.  It later declared that any pondok that did not properly display the Thai flag 
would be charged with treason,199 thus conjuring memories of Phibun’s ultra-nationalist 
regime.  The Deputy Education Minister further raised memories of past government’s 
cultural assimilation efforts when she declared that all pondok graduates would be 
required to “speak standard Thai properly”.200  Once again, the Thai government 
demonstrated it had failed to learn that historical attempts at assimilation and attacks on 
the traditional pondoks were still major sources of bitterness in the local population. 
Days later, the administration again downplayed the separatist nature of the 
insurgency by emphasizing a small number of separatists, saying there were no more than 
200 in the region.201  By the end of this month, attacks conducted by this supposedly 
small force of insurgents had already created so much fear, teachers in the area, 
concerned for their safety, refused to teach.  The administration’s initial solution, 
amazingly, was to propose soldiers replace teachers in the classrooms.202    
A month after the Narathiwat raid, the situation had further deteriorated.  Then 
Defense Minister Thanarak Isarangura claimed security forces needed to get tougher and 
should engage in retaliatory killing, saying: “I believe the situation will calm down if we 
can avenge (police deaths) in the same manner”. 203  Knowing this belief existed at an 
early stage, it would be no surprise if security forces are indeed donning civilian clothing 
and conducting personal attacks against suspected Malay-Muslim insurgents.  This 
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sentiment by the defense minister, as well as the numerous documented incidents of 
heavy-handed actions by the security forces, raises the question of exactly how closely 
the rule of law is being followed in battling the insurgency.  
In addition to martial law as Thaksin’s solution, he then first proposed on 12 
February a more strategic solution of throwing money at the problem.204  It has already 
been illustrated that southernmost Thailand is in need of economic development.  Thus, 
the initial proposal of investing 22.1 billion baht into the area sounds like good policy.  
Indeed economic development will help counter the insurgency, but only if it is sincere 
and in the best interests of the locals.  Also, it must be recognized that economic 
development is and must be a longer-term solution.  As Thaksin continued refining his 
economic plan, he did so under central guidance.  The Thai government needs to first 
have a deep understanding of what the people of the South want and need before it 
initiates an economic development plan.  Otherwise the Malay-Muslims, as they 
currently do, will simply perceive Thaksin’s economic development plan as yet another 
insincere attempt by the central government to suppress discontent for the short term.  
On 21 February, Thaksin dropped two more verbal bombshells.  First, he claimed 
that all the killings since 4 January had merely been an attempt to sidetrack the ongoing 
government probe of the Narathiwat depot raid.  Once again the prime minister 
demonstrated a complete failure in understanding the nature of the situation.  Then, that 
same day, he completely snubbed the South in suggesting he would visit the region more 
often if it would vote for his Thai Rak Thai Party in the 2005 election.205  This thesis has 
already highlighted the historical tendency by the Thai state to neglect the region in the 
larger political picture.  Malay-Muslims viewed these remarks as the acting Thai leader 
saying he really did not care about them.206  This perception only hurts the 
administration’s effort of reestablishing trust between all involved parties.             
After two months of making no progress in restoring peace to southern Thailand, 
Thaksin replaced his Defense Minister and Interior Minister.207  He replaced the region’s 
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army and police commanders ten days later.208  Thus started a pattern of firing and 
replacing top-level officials, tasked to confront the ever-growing insurgency, which 
continued throughout 2004.  This way of managing the conflict suggests two problems.  
First, continually changing top-level officials eliminates consistency in addressing the 
problem.  Additionally, new officials fighting for job security will naturally seek short-
term solutions that seemingly achieve immediate results at the cost of all necessary long-
term strategies.  Second, this management tactic suggests that Thaksin might be 
misplacing blame for the growth of the insurgency.  Instead of blaming all those around 
him, Thaksin would be better served to identify the real reasons the insurgency is not 
being controlled.  Thus, he should accept a large degree of blame himself. 
Almost three months after the 4 January raid, the government admitted that 
intelligence had not made any progress in sorting the situation.209  One year later, 
intelligence has still failed to make much progress in successfully analyzing the situation.  
Intelligence officials do not have a handle on which separatist groups are active in which 
ways, or exactly how criminal gangs or transnational terrorists tie into the equation.  As 
earlier stated, blame in large part for this must be placed on he current administration.  In 
disassembling the community and intelligence apparatuses present until 2002, it 
successfully eliminated all awareness for a couple years of what exactly was happening 
in the region.  Thaksin himself finally declared he was “dazed and confused” about the 
whole southern situation.210  The next day he reported that he was creating a new 
southern task force similar to the one he had earlier disbanded. 
On 5 April 2004, Deputy Prime Minister Chaturon Chaisang proposed a new 
seven-point plan to address the insurgency.  He formulated the plan after having spent the 
previous few weeks in the southernmost provinces visiting with locals, to include Islamic 
clergy, scholars, and teachers, and gaining their input.211  He directly turned their 
feedback into the seven-point plan, which included lifting martial law and offering 
amnesty to the separatists.  Even Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit fully supported the 
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plan.  This was a very viable plan that concretely accounted for the Malay-Muslim 
grievances, admitted the genuine causes of the Pattani plan, and would have implemented 
short and long-term measures to restore peace.  Nevertheless, Thaksin disapproved the 
plan two days later after Police Chief General Sunthorn Saikan expressed serious 
reservations.212  Chaturon then correctly warned that the insurgency would only worsen.  
In disapproving this plan, the Thaksin administration once again demonstrated gross 
conflict mismanagement.  It failed to even attempt the most comprehensive, viable plan 
that had been offered to-date for conflict resolution, and because his police chief, 
probably the most questionable ranking member present, had reservations. 
The administration’s inept handling of the crisis continued throughout 2004 and 
continues today.  As a result, the insurgency has continually worsened.  Martial law has 
continued increased resentment in the Malay-Muslim community.213  If the crisis is to be 
resolved, Thaksin’s administration must start managing the crisis much better than he 
has. 
Many observers assess Thaksin has been attempting to mold a political order 
parallel to that of Singapore or Malaysia in which a single dominant political party leads 
a supposedly democratic state with heavy-handed tactics.214  Thaksin has been iron-fisted 
in security matters since the start of his first administration.  Over 2500 people died in his 
war on drugs in 2003.  Many human rights organizations accused security officials of 
widespread human rights violations.  Nonetheless, Thaksin has gained more domestic 
support than opposition as a result of these efforts.215  However, he must realize that this 
supposed mandate of the people does not offer the solution to the Pattani problem.  His 
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C. ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND THE 9/11 FACTOR 
 
Islam in Southeast Asia is generally more moderate than in may other Islamic 
regions, such as the Middle East.  Several reasons account for this moderation.  For one, 
traders brought Islam to Southeast Asia.  This occurred well before the kingdom of 
Ayutthaya rose in power.  By contrast, Islam spread through much of South Asia and the 
Middle East by military conquest.  Thus, Islam in Southeast Asia lacked a core militancy.  
Another factor contributing to this moderation is that Islam, particularly in Indonesia, 
“was overlaid on animist, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions…which are said to give it a 
more syncretic aspect”.216  Islam is Southeast Asia is also more politically diverse than in 
other regions, particularly the Middle East. 
Asia as a whole has been experiencing an Islamic revival over the past few 
decades.  Several factors are responsible for this.  Internally, globalization and 
Westernization are largely responsible.  Accompanying these factors are those of rapid 
industrialization and urbanization.  The effects of globalization and Westernization, 
though not yet tremendous, are certainly apparent in southern Thailand.  The Malay-
Muslims particularly view the prime minister as a Western-educated, global-CEO style 
politician who has demonstrated a propensity towards globalization and Westernization 
in his policies.  They perceive the current building of a natural gas pipeline across the 
South, which could actually aid the economic development of the region, as an example 
of having these forces thrust upon them.  Externally, historical factors include the 
influences of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the revolution in Iran in 1979, the continued 
Kashmir conflict, and the Afghan war against the Soviets.  The most recent external 
influences are the export of Saudi-backed Wahabi Islamic fundamentalism, the 9/11 
attack, and the current U.S.-led conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.217                
Islamic fundamentalism has grown throughout Southeast Asia since the 
1970’s.218 The grievances of the minority radical Muslims in Southeast Asia are 
predominantly local in nature.  Nonetheless, there has been a sizeable growth in both 
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radical Islamists and their transnational activities.219  Today there exists an “attitudinal 
dynamic that is leading some Southeast Asian Muslims to look upon the extremism 
embodied in groups such as the Jemaah Islamiah and Al-Qaeda as a legitimate and 
acceptable political stance”.220  The Muslims in southernmost Thailand are no exception 
to this.    
Strong ties between transnational terrorists and local secessionists have never 
existed in Thailand before the turn of the century.221  Whether ties have strengthened 
since the turn of the century is still questionable.  Transnational terrorist operatives have 
certainly passed through Thailand and even taken up periodic residency there.  As 
reported in 2002, Omar al-Faruq, who had been one of the senior Al Qaeda leaders in 
Southeast Asia, confessed that Jemaah Islamiah had been trying to establish links with 
Muslim militants everywhere in region, including Thailand.222  Southern Thailand 
remains ripe with sympathy for Jemaah Islamiah.  In early 2002, most of the Jemaah 
Islamiah fugitives from Malaysia and Singapore fled to southern Thailand.  Thus, there is 
certainly a support network there.223  In August 2003, Thai authorities arrested noted 
transnational Jemaah Islamiah terrorist operator Hambali in Ayutthaya.  Arifin Ali, 
another Jemaah Islamiah leader, was also arrested in Thailand.  Of all the secessionists 
groups in southernmost Thailand, analysts most suspect GMIP to have ties to Jemaah 
Islamiah and Al Qaeda.224  Additionally, the Thai Defense Ministry attested that in the 
first three-quarters of 2004 alone, foreign Muslim organizations transferred over 100 
million baht into the hands of Malay-Muslim insurgents to fund violence.225  Thus, the 
evidence that there is strong external support for the current insurgency is overwhelming. 
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After 9/11, then Thai supreme commander, General Surayad Chulanont, stated 
that the Thai government was aware that “countries in the Middle East provide training, 
education, and financial support for fundamentalist groups in the south”.  Then secretary 
general of the Thai National Security Council, Gen Vinai Pattiyakul, admitted some 
southern Muslim radicals were trained in Afghanistan and Libya. Against this backdrop 
of growing Islamic fundamentalism throughout Southeast Asia and external support from 
radical Muslims to include links with transnational terrorists, the 9/11 attack must be 
examined as a key catalyst to increased violence in southern Thailand. 
Empirical data offers evidence that the number of terrorist incidents in Southeast 
Asia, and Thailand in particular, significantly rose in the three years following the 9/11 
attack over the three years preceding the 9/11 attack.  A comparison can be made 
between with the three Southeast Asian countries that have the highest level of terrorist 
activity: Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.  In the three years between 11 
September 1998 and 11 September 2001, there were a total of 168 reported terrorist 
incidents, broken down as: seventy-nine in Indonesia, seventy-nine in the Philippines, 
and ten in Thailand.  In the three years after the 9/11 attack, between 11 September 2001 
and 11 September 2004, there were 284 reported terrorist incidents, broken down as: one 
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Figure 8.   Number of Terrorist Incidents: 11 September 2001 – 11 September 2004 228
 
A closer assessment of these numbers shows a total of 116 more terrorist 
incidents after 9/11, which is an increase in terrorist activity of 69 percent.  Though the 
number of terrorist incidents increased in all three countries, the greatest increase was in 
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Thailand.  The rate of terrorist activity in Thailand increased by 810 percent.  This is a 
phenomenal increase in terrorist activity after 9/11. 
An even closer analysis of these terrorist incidents reveals even more worrisome 
data.  Eliminating Thailand, the country with by far the most substantial increase in 
terrorist incidents,229 from the equation and simply studying Indonesia and the 
Philippines, one readily sees that the increased frequency of terrorist incidents has been 
accompanied by an increase in severity.  The terrorist incidents in the three years 
preceding 9/11 resulted in 1188 injuries.  Those in the three years after yielded 1804 
incidents.  Thus, a 22 percent increase in terrorist rate produced a 51 percent increase in 
severity as measured by total injuries.   
Another measure of severity besides injuries is total deaths.  When measured by 
deaths, the increase in severity accompanying the increased frequency of terrorist 
incidents is even more dramatic.  Once again focusing on Indonesia and the Philippines, 
the three years preceding 9/11 resulted in 204 deaths, compared to 660 deaths in the three 
years after.  This increase of 456 deaths is a 224 percent increase in fatalities.   
These numbers are extremely suggestive.  First, they suggest that the 9/11 attack 
sparked an increase in number of terrorist incidents in Southeast Asia.  This is 
particularly true in Thailand.  Second, they suggest that the 9/11 attack ignited an 
increase in the severity of terrorist attacks throughout Southeast Asia.  This severity in 
Thailand alone increased as the year 2004 proceeded, and has increased yet again in 2005 
as compared to the previous year.230
Thus, empirical data illustrates a correlation between the 9/11 attack and the 
growing insurgency throughout Southeast Asia, and in particular Thailand.  The 9/11 
attack emboldened Malay-Muslim militants in their efforts against the Thai state.  It also 
served as a model for the effectiveness of an attack of greater severity, measured in 
injuries and deaths.  The insurgents have mirrored this model of severity in increasing the 
severity of their own attacks.  Though this empirical evidence alone does not prove that 
the 9/11 attack was a catalyst for the current insurgency in southern Thailand, the 
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correlation suggested by this evidence suggests a strong likelihood that the 9/11 attack 
was indeed a catalyst. 
The fundamental condition for this rekindled insurgency was always present.  The 
year 2001 saw two events ignite this condition: a new state government and a victory for 
the fundamental Islamists.  Now what awaits to be seen is the direction in which this 
insurgency moves.  As the more time goes by in which the insurgency is not somehow 
controlled, which can only be done by resolving the core historical grievances, the greater 
the chance that it will become part of today’s greatest threat to United States security, that 
of the transnational terror movement.  Academic Joseph Liow perhaps stated this most 
eloquently: “…it is the very existence of residual grievances within the Malay-Muslim 
community that will determine whether or not international Islamic terrorist networks can 



























This thesis has focused on the ongoing secessionist insurgency in southern 
Thailand.  It has examined the historical Malay-Muslim relations with the Thai state, 
current demographics of the southernmost provinces in which the insurgency is ongoing, 
and the nature of the secessionist insurgency.  These topics were analyzed in order to 
draw a conclusion as to what the causes of the insurgency are.  Founded on the 
theoretical basis that insurgencies emerge from structural maladjustments, and that level 
of government suppression and external support are two important variables in providing 
increased momentum to insurgencies, the thesis establishes an equation for the onset and 
escalation of Thailand’s southern insurgency.  As such, this thesis maintains that the root 
cause of this insurgency in the continued existence of structural factors that have 
historically been the source of Malay-Muslim grievances with the Thai state.  These 
structural factors include relative economic deprivation, lack of political participation, 
and the struggle for ethnic identity maintenance.  Two factors catalyzed this root cause in 
2001.  The first was the emergence of a new government administration.  This 
administration through certain early policy decisions not only allowed the insurgency to 
once again emerge, but its mismanagement of the current crisis has also increased the 
size and severity of the insurgency.  Additionally, the growing influence of a more radical 
Islam, clearly seen by the southern insurgents in the 9/11 attack, has strengthened both 
the will and arguably the ability of the current insurgency.  Thus, structural factors, 
responsive government suppression, and external support are three important variables in 
understanding Thailand’s current insurgency. 
If the Thai government really wants to resolve this current crisis, it can.  
However, given the nature of insurgencies and the damage to conflict resolution that has 
already been done, this will take several years as a minimum.  The government must be 
willing to admit the real causes of the insurgency.  Eliminating the core element at the 
heart of this insurgency will remove the kindling that future sparks could ignite.  As such, 
it must be willing to induce genuine structural changes that address the Malay-Muslims’ 
historical grievances, and such structural changes do not happen quickly.   
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As a start, efforts should be taken to improve the southernmost provinces’ 
economic situation.  Careful consideration must be given to exactly how the money will 
be used.  The development of the fishing, agriculture, and small business industries 
should be a focus of any financial development package.  Economic development must 
be oriented towards the needs and particularities of the Malay-Muslim population.   
Rather than bringing pondoks under greater central control, the Thai government 
should encourage the further Malay-Muslim development of the unique pondok system 
by lending it state support, not state control.  Provision of infrastructure needs like 
electricity, as well as educational needs like computers, are examples of such positive 
support.  A change in government perception is key to this.  The government should not 
see the whole pondok system as a source of insurgency.  The reality is that only a small 
minority of pondoks is believed by analysts to be fomenting insurgent activity.  
Furthermore, the government should consider giving greater authority to a local 
government Muslim organization to oversee the needs and development of these 
pondoks, including curriculum standards.  As an additional measure, the government 
should institute programs that will keep Muslim students in Thailand for higher 
education.  Increasing the opportunities for Malay-Muslim youth will aid conflict 
resolution. 
In the meantime, the Thai government can take steps to eliminate the two catalytic 
factors in this crisis.  It should end martial law and severely draw down the number of 
troops in the southernmost provinces.  Martial law with increased troop presence has only 
served to worsen the insurgency.  The security focus should be two-fold. First, the Thai 
security apparatus must drastically improve its intelligence picture of the situation.  This 
is necessary to address which entities have what exact role in this insurgency.  It is also 
necessary to reduce foreign support, including funding, of the insurgency.  Until this is 
accomplished, the potential for continued near-term re-ignition of the problem is always 
present. Second, it must take immediate steps in reestablishing already severely lost trust 
with the Malay-Muslim community.  This is immediately needed within the context of 
local police forces.  The Malay-Muslims have long known policemen in the southernmost 
provinces for their corruption, heavy-handedness, and extra-judicial actions.  A complete 
overhaul of the local police system is necessary for progress.  As community relations 
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with the security forces improves, so too will the intelligence picture improve.  Likewise, 
a clearer intelligence picture can aid community relations. 
These suggestions are just a beginning towards conflict resolution.  The Thai 
government will need to engage in a collaborative effort in formulating both a short and 
long-term plan for conflict resolution.  Thailand has many capable individuals that can 
aid this process.  The government should not exclude anyone from this collaborative 
effort.  As for ideas of what is required for resolution, it should not be necessary to devise 
new ideas.  Many sound ideas have already been advanced, such as those by Deputy 
Prime Minister Chaturon April 2004.  Likewise, the Thai administration should revisit its 
own history to see what lessons should have been learned.  For example, the reign of 
premier Prem in the 1980’s included many positive achievements towards conflict 
resolution.  General Prem has already established himself a wise councilor in state affairs, 
and as such currently serves as the president of King Bhumibol’s privy councilors.  The 
current administration should consider what role he could have in conflict resolution. 
Given all the available potential for conflict resolution that the Thai government 
has readily available, the outlook nonetheless remains pessimistic.  The structural 
changes required to overcome the insurgency would probably require a deep reshaping of 
the structure of rule, including greater decentralization and limited regional autonomy.  
History offers little evidence of bureaucratized states like Thailand reshaping themselves 
in such a manner.  Regardless of a genuine need for restructure, institutional interests in 
favor of the status quo tend to run deep.  Furthermore, the current Thaksin administration 
has consistently displayed a penchant towards greater centralized bureaucratic control 
throughout Thai society.  The probability of a complete reversal by this administration is 
minimal.  While structural change must come from within the Thai government, external 
pressure may need to come from outside the Thai government to initiate internal reform.    
For the reasons earlier given, it remains important for the United States that this 
insurgency is resolved.  As such, the United States might have to assume the role of an 
external power that induces the Thai government to begin structural change.  A warning 
should be echoed here, however.  The United States, in its effort to destroy terrorist 
groups, must be careful not to further undermine democracy in Thailand by increasingly 
entrenching what appears to be a growing authoritarian regime in return for cooperation 
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in the its against terror.  This would only serve to further nourish the social and political 
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